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CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A QUESTION OF LAW, NOT FACT
SUSAN FREIWALD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite how much we use new communications technologies like
e-mail and cell phones, federal appellate courts have provided little
guidance about what the Fourth Amendment1 requires of law enforce-
ment agents before they may obtain our electronic communications.2
Several factors explain why federal appellate courts have considered
so few constitutional challenges to “online surveillance” practices.3
To begin with, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)
furnishes little incentive for defendants to bring statutory claims
against law enforcement acquisition of their electronic communica-
tions because the ECPA provides no exclusionary remedy.4  To suc-
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1. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued a decision between
the drafting of this Article and its publication that recognized a Fourth Amendment inter-
est in e-mail stored with a service provider. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274
(6th Cir. 2010).  For further discussion of the Warshak case and earlier decisions pertaining
to the case against Warshak, see infra text accompanying notes 118–22. R
3. See generally Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap
Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9 (2004) [hereinafter Freiwald, Online Surveillance] (describing the
statutory and constitutional rules pertaining to government surveillance of online
communications).
4. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2006) (providing a statutory suppression remedy for im-
proper interceptions of wire and oral communications, but not electronic communica-
tions), with id. § 2708 (“The remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only
judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”). See gen-
erally Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would
Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 805, 807–08 (2003) (recommending a statu-
tory suppression remedy for electronic communications).
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cessfully have such evidence excluded from trial, defendants must
establish a Fourth Amendment violation and overcome a good faith
defense.5  Citing a lack of precedent, courts have refused even to con-
sider Fourth Amendment questions in some cases after crediting
agents’ claims that they acted in good faith.6  While the lack of prece-
dent will persist until a court issues a decision, that fact alone has not
compelled a court to act.7  Exacerbating the lack of challenges from
defendants who likely perceive insurmountable odds, executive
branch litigators have themselves strategically avoided appealing cases
to preserve the prerogatives that a definitive constitutional ruling
against them would eliminate.8  The absence of cases from the last
several decades means that when government lawyers do argue that
their practices satisfy Fourth Amendment mandates, they rely on Su-
preme Court cases from the 1970s and 1980s that addressed primitive
ancestors of the electronic communications technologies in use
today.9
All that might have changed last year when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision about
whether to permit government agents to obtain, without a warrant,
cell phone subscribers’ location data—for example, records of the cell
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 508 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply where the challenged evidence was
obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute even if that
statute was later determined to be unconstitutional.”); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of
Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶4, ¶13, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/
freiwald-first-principles.pdf [hereinafter Freiwald, First Principles] (noting that the lack of a
statutory suppression remedy inhibits defendants from bringing these cases).
6. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288–92 (relying on Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987), in denying a motion to suppress stored e-mails on the basis of “good faith” reliance
on statute); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL
4200156, at *11–13 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (explaining that even if government access to
historical cell site location information violated the Fourth Amendment, the “good faith”
exception would preclude any exclusionary remedy).
7. Cf. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical
Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter CSI: Brooklyn]
(describing the lack of settled precedent in this area of law), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn, 736
F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No. 11.  This Article will follow the naming
convention set out in CSI: Brooklyn, id. at 580 n.4, instead of using the cumbersome titles
each time I refer to cases involving location data.
8. See id. at 580 n.5 (discussing the government’s failure to appeal cases); see also Cath-
erine Crump & Christopher Calabrese, Location Tracking: Muddled and Uncertain Standards
Harm Americans’ Privacy, 88 CRIM. L. REP. 19 (2010) (concluding, from a study of Freedom
of Information Act requests, that government lawyers strategically avoid appealing adverse
rulings).
9. See infra Parts IV–V.
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towers (“cell site information” or “CSI”)10 with which a mobile phone
communicates—which indicate the phone’s physical location (also
known as “location data”).11  The government claimed the right to
compel a service provider to disclose location data whenever govern-
ment agents overcome the easier-to-meet procedural hurdles for non-
contents records in the ECPA, instead of having to first obtain a war-
rant based on probable cause under the Fourth Amendment stan-
dard.  In particular, the government claimed it could compel
disclosure of stored location data so long as it obtained a court order,
referred to as a “D order,” under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), which requires
“specific and articulable facts showing . . . reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the . . . records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”12  Lower courts in the case previously denied
the government’s application and rejected both its statutory and con-
stitutional arguments.13  Had the court in CSI: Third Circuit held that
the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant before agents may compel
a service provider to disclose location data, the court would have pro-
vided crucial constitutional guidance to lower courts.  Federal district
courts are currently considering location data applications and dis-
agreeing about the proper rule.14  If the court had actually analyzed
reasonable expectations of privacy in new electronic communications,
it would have yielded valuable insights for similar cases that involve
online surveillance practices.
The majority in CSI: Third Circuit, however, did not provide a de-
finitive Fourth Amendment analysis.  Instead, it held that magistrate
10. Cell sites may be located on stand-alone towers or on top of pre-existing buildings.
See PAUL BEDELL, WIRELESS CRASH COURSE 37–38 (2d ed. 2005).  I will refer to cell sites as
cell towers because the latter term seems easier to visualize.
11. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter
CSI: Third Circuit].
12. Id. at 315 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
13. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586, 612, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
[hereinafter CSI: Pittsburgh], aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10,
2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
14. See generally ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81–85 & n.14 (2010) [hereinafter June Hearings]  (statement of
Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (summarizing inconsistent decisions), available at http:/
/judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-109_57082.pdf; Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 29 (2010) [hereinafter May Hearings]
(statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (testifying about inconsistent deci-
sions among magistrate judges within the same judicial district).
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judges retain the option to impose a warrant requirement on govern-
ment agents who seek location data or may instead permit them to
satisfy the less demanding statutory standard before obtaining an or-
der compelling disclosure.15  The majority remanded the case to the
magistrate judge who had first considered the government’s applica-
tion with instructions to choose the appropriate standard, warrant or
D order, and then to determine whether the government’s applica-
tion satisfied the chosen requirement.16  The court also directed the
magistrate judge to make factual findings and provide an explanation
if she demands a warrant.17
The Third Circuit construed the statute to permit magistrate
judges to demand a warrant in appropriate cases but did not go fur-
ther to find that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant in all
cases in which law enforcement seeks location data.18  The majority,
however, did address the Fourth Amendment by rejecting the govern-
ment’s argument that either a broad “third party” rule from United
States v. Miller19 or a broad “non-contents” rule from Smith v. Mary-
land20 resolved the case in the government’s favor.21  As one of the
very few federal appellate decisions to consider reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in new communication technologies, the majority’s
constitutional reasoning should prove significant and influential.22
At the same time, and more in dicta, the majority narrowly con-
strued the protection offered by a pair of Supreme Court cases from
the 1980s, which considered how the Fourth Amendment regulates
the use of tracking radios placed in cars or on their bumpers
(“bumper-beepers”).23  Although the court remanded to the magis-
trate judge to determine whether the government’s demand for loca-
15. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 319.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.  Interestingly, a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Texas ruled on the
constitutional question six weeks later. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site
Data, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter CSI: Houston III] (“Compelled warrantless disclosure of cell site data violates the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”); see also infra note 385. R
19. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (holding that a defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests
were not implicated when a subpoena was issued to his bank to obtain records of his bank-
ing activity).
20. 442 U.S. 735, 741–42, 745 (1979) (finding that a defendant has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed).
21. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 317–18.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 118–23. R
23. See CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 312–13 (discussing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).  Although the electronic track-
ing device beepers are not always attached to bumpers, they have been commonly referred
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tion data intruded on reasonable expectations of privacy, the
majority’s language indicated that only if the records yielded informa-
tion about the inside of the targets’ home or curtilage would the inves-
tigation implicate the Fourth Amendment.24  While the majority’s
language recognized that location data acquisition could intrude on
reasonable expectations of privacy either directly or by permitting in-
ferences, the court failed to recognize that even outside-the-home in-
formation can implicate Fourth Amendment rights.  By contrast, in
United States v. Maynard,25 issued just three weeks before CSI: Third
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit held that law enforcement use of a global posi-
tioning system (“GPS”) tracking device on a car to obtain location in-
formation represents “prolonged surveillance” that requires a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment.26  The D.C. Circuit recognized that a
GPS device reveals patterns of activity and permits the creation of an
intimate picture of the target’s life, whether or not such information
yields insights or inferences about the inside of the target’s home.27
The Third Circuit’s more cabined view of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion surely explains much of the court’s reluctance to decide that a
warrant is required in all cases of cell-site location surveillance.28
In fact, the majority in CSI: Third Circuit might claim that even if it
had been inclined to resolve the constitutional question more
broadly, the statutory interpretation doctrine of constitutional avoid-
ance advises against deciding the case on constitutional grounds
where another plausible interpretation is available.29  Because the ma-
jority found a statutory way to resolve the conflict,30 the judges may
contend that one need no further explanation for their failure to
to as “bumper-beepers.” See Margaret B. Gramoglia, Comment, Electronic Tracking Devices
and the Fourth Amendment—United States v. Michael, 16 GA. L. REV. 197, 197 n.3 (1981).
24. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 312–13.  The concurrence clarified that rule, but
presumably could not get the other judge (or judges) to include that language directly in
the majority opinion. Id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring).
25. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010).
26. Id. at 562–63, 568.
27. Id. at 563; see also CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *14
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) (following Maynard and denying warrantless requests for location
data as in violation of the Fourth Amendment); CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581–85
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying the Maynard approach to location data obtained from cell
phones), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No.
11.
28. See CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 312–13 (“The Knotts/Karo opinions make clear
that the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home.”).
29. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“‘[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to,
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155
U.S. 648, 657 (1895))).
30. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 319.
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more directly address the Fourth Amendment question.  The author
of the majority opinion indicated at oral argument that she had no
intention of reaching the constitutional question when the case could
be decided on statutory grounds.31  The concurring judge on the
panel, however, faulted the other two judges for asking the magistrate
judge to determine whether a warrant was required without sufficient
guidance about the Fourth Amendment’s requirements.32  With a few
exceptions,33 magistrate judges seem hesitant to conduct the constitu-
tional analysis themselves and express the need for the authority and
uniformity that an appellate decision would provide.34
Beyond CSI: Third Circuit, the lack of clear guidance on Fourth
Amendment questions creates significant problems.  Because of the
good faith rule, discussed above,35 the absence of privacy-protective
decisions permits the executive branch to conduct intrusive online
surveillance effectively free of constitutional constraints.36  Those pri-
vacy-invading practices will continue until either the courts step up or
31. See Oral Argument at 30:30–31:00, CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227),
available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/08-4227-ApplicationofUSA.
wma (Judge Sloviter indicating that she has “set aside the Constitution” in recognition of
the need to decide the case on statutory grounds if possible); see also id. at 3:55–4:05 (Judge
Sloviter noting the obligation to make a decision based on the statute if possible).  The
other judge in the majority, Judge Roth, was absent from the oral argument, so she ex-
pressed no opinion on her preference, if any, for statutory resolution.
32. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 319–20 (Tashima, J., concurring) (“I do not believe
that these contradictory signals give either magistrate judges or prosecutors any standards
by which to judge whether an application for a [D order] is or is not legally sufficient.”).
33. See CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *6–14 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 29, 2010) (finding, in a comprehensive opinion, that warrantless acquisition of loca-
tion data violates the Fourth Amendment); CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582–95
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (carefully analyzing cell phone users’ expectations of privacy), rev’d, Or-
der, CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No. 11.  Even the
magistrate judge in CSI: Pittsburgh, whose decision covered more than thirty reporter pages
and was joined by four other magistrate judges, did not decide the Fourth Amendment
question definitively, but instead concluded that permitting warrantless access to location
data would “raise[ ] serious Fourth Amendment concerns” and so construed the statute to
avoid it. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting In re Applica-
tion for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d
747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter CSI: Houston I]), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL
4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
34. See, e.g., CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (urging the government to appeal
the decision on cell site location so that a higher court can provide more authoritative
guidance on this important matter); see also June Hearings, supra note 14, at 83 n.14 (state- R
ment of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (“Unfortunately, with a single exception in five
years, [the plea in CSI: Houston I] has fallen on deaf ears.”).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. R
36. In other words, the executive branch behaves in ways I believe violate the Fourth
Amendment, but no clear precedent effectively constrains executive branch investigative
practices. But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 289 n.17 (6th Cir. 2010)  (noting
that in light of the decision finding the statutory provision unconstitutional, “the good-
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Congress steps in to revise the ECPA.  As Congress currently considers
reform of the surveillance laws, individual members have indicated an
unwillingness to rein in law enforcement powers significantly or in-
hibit national security protection.37  Historically, Congress has drag-
ged its heels in protecting communications privacy until the courts
have demanded it.38  Congress spent over a decade convening hear-
ings about the need to regulate wiretapping but did not pass the Wire-
tap Act until 1968, just after the Supreme Court decided two cases in
1967 that announced explicit Fourth Amendment requirements for
the practice.39  Until the federal appellate courts clarify how the
Fourth Amendment regulates new communication technologies, Con-
gress will not feel constitutional constraints.40  Quite the contrary,
Congress will hear regularly from executive branch officials that new
technologies lack Fourth Amendment protection entirely.41
faith calculus has changed, and a reasonable officer may no longer assume that the Consti-
tution permits warrantless searches of private emails”).
37. See, e.g., Memorandum on the Elec. Commc’ns Privacy Act: Promoting Privacy in
the Digital Age from Senate Judiciary Comm. Minority Staff 9 (Sept. 17, 2010) (on file with
the Maryland Law Review) [hereinafter Minority Staff Memorandum] (“A probable cause
standard for retrospective information would devastate law enforcement’s ability to use this
data, which is critical for the investigation and prosecution of serious offenses such as drug
smuggling.”).
38. Prior to the passage of the Wiretap Act in 1968, some believed that without Su-
preme Court guidance, Congress would never act. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Wiretapping-
Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor’s View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891, 924 (1960) (“Until the High
Court is heard from, the whole area of wiretapping and federal-state relations must be
regarded as quite unsettled.”); Edward Bennett Williams, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Problem: A Defense Counsel’s View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 855, 870 (1960) (“Experience has demon-
strated the difficulty of obtaining adequate legislation.  If there is to be reform, it must
begin with the courts.”).
39. Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 3, at 74–76 (describing the period leading R
up to passage of the Wiretap Act).
40. Indeed, unless the Fourth Amendment applies, congressional legislators may view
any protection they give to location data as entirely optional. See, e.g., Minority Staff Memo-
randum, supra note 37, at 6 (“[The Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s] current pro- R
visions already go far beyond those required by the Fourth Amendment to protect the
privacy interests of users of telecommunications services, a point which is rarely acknowl-
edged by supporters of ECPA changes.”).  It is not clear whether the Third Circuit majority
agreed with that view when it wrote, “[C]onsiderations for and against a [probable cause]
requirement would be for Congress to balance.” CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d
Cir. 2010).  If so, that would seem to contradict other parts of the decision where the
majority recognized the possibility of location data investigations violating the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 318 (discussing the need to consider
language in Karo in which the Supreme Court discussed the need for “‘Fourth Amend-
ment oversight’” (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984))).  In those
cases, courts could overturn any congressional balancing if not sufficiently cognizant of
Fourth Amendment interests.
41. See, e.g., June Hearings, supra note 14, at 62 (statement of Richard Littlehale, Assis- R
tant Special Agent in Charge, Technical Services Unit, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation)
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The Third Circuit panel must have been aware of the costs of
declining to provide a definitive Fourth Amendment ruling.  In addi-
tion to the Supreme Court’s narrow view of the bumper-beeper cases,
I believe that two other factors contributed to the Third Circuit’s re-
luctance to address the Fourth Amendment directly.  First, determin-
ing reasonable expectations of privacy is challenging, at best,42
particularly in the context of new communications technology.  Lower
courts have tended to avoid conducting a full-scale expectations-of-
privacy analysis by resorting to the same analytical short cuts43 that the
government urged the Third Circuit to use.44  As mentioned, the ma-
jority declined the government’s invitation to reverse the lower courts
by simply characterizing the location records as unprotected “non-
contents data” or “third party records.”45  Second, which proved to be
more of a stumbling block, the court was uncertain about the scope
and power of location information. CSI: Third Circuit bears obvious
similarities to the Supreme Court’s June 2010 decision in City of Onta-
rio v. Quon.46  Although the Quon Court assumed it, the Court refused
to actually determine whether users have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their text messages, observing that “[t]he judiciary risks er-
ror by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”47
The Third Circuit seemed to share a similar concern that it may be
too early to say whether location data implicates the Fourth Amend-
ment, although for the majority, the problem was that the record was
(noting that the ECPA grants more privacy than needed to “communications records”);
Anti-Terrorism Investigations and the Fourth Amendment After September 11, 2001: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 12 (2003) (state-
ment of Viet D. Dinh, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice)
available at http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/87238.pdf (describing how
some of the procedural requirements in the ECPA, although they do not include a war-
rant, notice, civil remedy or suppression remedy, “exceed those imposed by the Fourth
Amendment”).
42. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (suggesting the Katz test “has
often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable”); Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383–86 (1974)
(“[Katz] offers neither a comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage nor any posi-
tive principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved.”).
43. Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5, ¶¶ 36–49. R
44. See CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 317–18 (discussing the government’s arguments
for a broad third-party rule); Brief for the United States at 11, 26–28, CSI: Third Circuit, 620
F.3d 304 (No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866618.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21. R
46. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
47. Id. at 2629.  The Court went on to question whether it had the knowledge and
experience with text messages that the Court had in 1967 regarding telephone conversa-
tions. Id.
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incomplete.48  As the chief counsel for Microsoft told Congress a few
weeks after the Third Circuit’s decision, however, if the courts take
too long to address new technology, they create the risk not only that
the technology they do address will be obsolete but also “that the
Fourth Amendment will never really catch up.”49
In this Article, I will address three hurdles to federal appellate
resolution of the Fourth Amendment question in the location privacy
cases: (1) concern about the novelty of the technology and lack of
experience with its use as a surveillance tool,50 (2) an unduly con-
strained view of the bumper-beeper cases as protecting only informa-
tion about activities inside the home and curtilage,51 and (3) the
inordinate appeal of short cuts (the non-contents and third party
rules) to a meaningful reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.52
Although the majority resisted taking analytical short cuts in CSI: Third
Circuit, the government has achieved some success with them and con-
tinues to champion the short cuts in other cases.53  These three hur-
dles will continue to inhibit Fourth Amendment resolution of location
data cases.  Moving past these hurdles undoubtedly will benefit resolu-
tion of related cases and provide the much needed constitutional gui-
dance that only the courts can provide.
In Part II, I will provide more background about the CSI: Third
Circuit case, including what makes it unusual.  Part III will elaborate
on location data technology; it will describe what location data
records may contain and how powerfully that information intrudes
into our private lives.  Part IV will discuss the bumper-beeper cases
and will argue that, given the richness of location information, the
Maynard court articulated a more defensible understanding of how
the bumper-beeper precedents apply.  Under a proper understanding
48. See CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 312 (“We see no need to decide [whether the
location information could encroach upon reasonable expectations of privacy] without a
factual record on which to ground the analysis.”); id. at 318 (“The record does not demon-
strate whether [locating cell phones within a relatively small area] can be accomplished
with present technology, and we cannot predict the capabilities of future technology.”).
49. See Audio File: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, The Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, at
88:30–89:10 (2010) [hereinafter September Senate Hearings] (oral statement of Brad Smith,
Esq., General Counsel of Microsoft Corporation), available at http://www.senate.gov/
fplayers/CommPlayer/commFlashPlayer.cfm?fn=judiciary092210&st=xxx.
50. See infra Part III.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. See infra Part V.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (finding no Fourth Amendment interest in location data because it was
voluntarily turned over to a third party); United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-
MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (same).
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of the Fourth Amendment, magistrate judges should require warrants
based on probable cause for location data in all cases, notwithstanding
language by the Third Circuit that suggested such power should be
exercised “sparingly.”54  Part V will argue that the Third Circuit prop-
erly rejected application of the Smith and Miller precedents to location
data because acquisition of that data violates reasonable expectations
of privacy.  I will also briefly articulate a modified approach to the
reasonable expectations of privacy analysis that considers the nature
of the surveillance itself and the associated need for close judicial su-
pervision.55  I will conclude that courts should decide, based on con-
stitutional law, that applications for location data must satisfy the
probable cause standard of the warrant requirement.  As a result, and
contrary to the majority in CSI: Third Circuit, magistrate judges should
require government applicants to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause as a matter of law, and not as a matter of fact after “balanc[ing]
the Government’s need (not merely desire) for the information with
the privacy interests of cell phone users.”56
II. BACKGROUND OF CSI: THIRD CIRCUIT
The litigation began in November 2007, when the government
applied for a court order to compel a cellular phone service provider
to turn over its location data records for a particular subscriber (“tar-
get”).57  In an opinion joined by four other magistrate judges, a magis-
trate judge in the Western District of Pennsylvania denied the
application because the federal agents had not furnished probable
cause for a warrant.58  Instead, applicants had sought to satisfy only
the less demanding D order standard of the Stored Communications
Act (“SCA”),59 which is applicable to non-contents records of an elec-
54. See CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing the choice to
require a warrant as “an option to be used sparingly because Congress also included the
option of a [D] order.”).
55. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5, ¶¶ 71–76 (applying the four factor test to R
stored e-mail content data).
56. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 319.
57. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 4. R
58. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  Inconsistency
among individual magistrate judges within jurisdictions has made it difficult for service
providers to know how to comply with the law. See May Hearings, supra note 14, at 29 R
(statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (“[T]he proper legal standard [for
access to location information] is more confusing when federal magistrates sitting in the
same federal district in a state disagree . . . [.]”).
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2006).  The SCA is the second of three titles of the ECPA.
Pub. L. No. 99-508, sec. 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986).
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tronic communication service provider.60  In fact, the magistrate
judge found that the non-contents records provision of the SCA,
which applies to “a record or other information pertaining to a sub-
scriber to or customer of [an electronic communication] service,”61
did not cover location data.  The court first explained that the defini-
tion of “electronic communications” specifically excludes information
obtained from a “tracking device.”62  It further reasoned that cell
phones qualify as a kind of “tracking device,” thus prohibiting the col-
lection of cell phone generated location data under a D order.63  The
magistrate judge found that the authority to compel location data
must come from outside the SCA.64  In so finding, the court joined
other courts that have imposed the warrant requirement of Rule 41 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 41”), in part to avoid
Fourth Amendment problems.65  The government appealed that de-
nial to the district court, arguing that the magistrate judge was re-
quired to grant the application if she found the D Order
requirements met.66
60. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588–89 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
62. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 601; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (excluding
“any communication from a tracking device” from the definition of “electronic
communication”).
63. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 602–03 & n.44; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (defin-
ing “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object”).
64. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
65. Id. at 616 (“‘Absent any sign that Congress has squarely addressed and resolved
those concerns in favor of law enforcement, the more prudent course is to avoid an inter-
pretation that risks a constitutional collision.’” (quoting CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d
747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005))).  The court noted that Rule 41 had traditionally been used to
authorize tracking device investigations. Id. at 592.  Congress amended Rule 41 in 2006
specifically to include tracking devices. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(2) Committee
Notes on Rules—2006 Amendment.  The magistrate judge’s decision did not specify
whether such orders would include notice to the target or what other remedies would be
available for improper investigations.  One recent decision, however, has asserted that the
government must furnish notice to the target, not merely to the provider, to comply with
the tracking device provisions of Rule 41. In re Application of U.S. for & [sic] Order: (1)
Authorizing Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber & Other Info.; & (3) Authorizing Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F.
Supp. 2d 571, 580–81 (W.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter CSI: Austin] (explaining that Rule 41
is not satisfied if the government fails to provide notice to the target (citing FED. R. CRIM.
P. 41(f)(2)(C))).
66. See Gov’t Memorandum of Law in Support of Request for Review at 5–8, In re Appli-
cation of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008) (No. 07-524M), 2008 WL
3861765 [hereinafter CSI: Intermediate] (arguing that the plain language of the statute com-
pels the court to reverse the magistrate judge’s holding).
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As arguably permitted by the SCA,67 the government had not pro-
vided notice to the target of the investigation.68  Interestingly, the tar-
get whose records the government sought was not actually the suspect
of a crime but rather someone whose cell phone had been used by a
suspect in a narcotics investigation.69  Obviously, the target could not
mount an opposition to the government’s demand for her location
data when she had no idea it had taken place; the application was
under seal and the provider was not permitted to inform her.70
Rather than hear arguments only from the government, the district
court took the unusual, but not unprecedented,71 step of inviting
briefs from those who would oppose the government’s application.  In
particular, the court invited briefing from the Electronic Frontier
Foundation (“EFF”),72 an online civil liberties activist group that rep-
resented several other similar groups (“Civil Liberties Amici”);73 the
67. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 307 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that notice is not
required under the statute (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3))). But see In re Sealing & Non-
Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(D) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 886–87 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(“[E]lectronic surveillance gag orders of unlimited duration must be the exception rather
than the rule.”); June Hearings, supra note 14, at 87–90 & n.28 (statement of Stephen Wm. R
Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (discussing the problem of imposing gag orders on service providers
that are not justified by the SCA).
68. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 307; see also CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 586
(describing the cell phone service provider’s disclosure of location information as
“covert”).
69. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588 & n.11.  I will refer to the subscriber whose
location data the government sought using the female pronoun, and I will use the male
pronoun to refer to targets in general.
70. Id. at 588; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (permitting the government to request a
nondisclosure order). See generally Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8 (discussing how the R
fact that almost all location data cases are under seal indefinitely and ex parte inhibits
public knowledge of investigative practices).
71. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal
Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 687 (2008)
(“[W]hen judges perceive a need for additional information they will occasionally request
amicus participation.”).
72. Cell Tracking, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., www.eff.org/issues/cell-tracking (last
visited Mar. 26, 2011) (providing information about cases in which courts have invited EFF
to counter government position). See generally Kevin S. Bankston, Only the DOJ Knows: The
Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 589, 612–13 (2007) (describing cases in
which magistrate judges and district courts had requested input from EFF on electronic
surveillance cases).
73. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Opposition to the
Government’s Request for Review, CSI: Intermediate, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10,
2008) (No. 07-524M), 2008 WL 3861767 [hereinafter Civil Liberties Amici, D.C. Brief].
The American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU-Foundation of Pennsylvania, INC., and the
Center for Democracy and Technology joined the EFF. Id.
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public defender for the Western District of Pennsylvania;74 and me, an
academic with pertinent experience.75  All three amici urged the dis-
trict court to affirm the denial of the government’s application,76
which it did, without separate analysis, after considering all the
submissions.77
When the government appealed to the Third Circuit, it repeated
its claim that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to location
data.78  The government also argued that, as a matter of statutory law,
magistrate judges must grant every government application for loca-
tion data that satisfies the D order standard applicable to non-con-
tents records.79  The Civil Liberties Amici agreed with the government
that the non-contents records provision applied to location data,80
and rejected the lower courts’ finding that, as data from a tracking
74. Brief of Amici Curiae Federal Public Defender in Opposition to the Government’s
Request for Review, CSI: Intermediate, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008) (No. 07-
524M), 2008 WL 3861768 [hereinafter Public Defender, D.C. Brief].
75. Brief of Amici Curiae Susan Freiwald in Favor of Affirmance, CSI: Intermediate, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008) (No. 07-524M), 2008 WL 3861766 [hereinafter
Freiwald, D.C. Brief].  At that time, I had written law review articles that had been cited in
other location data cases. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing
(1) Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to
Customer Records, & (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816, 826 n.20 (S.D. Tex.
2006) (citing Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the Digital Te-
lephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 982–89 (1996) [hereinafter Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy])
(explaining that advances in technology should require the government to change its sur-
veillance procedures); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use
of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info.
and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (same).  The magistrate
judge had also cited one of my articles. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 586 n.7, 615
n.81 (citing Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5); see also Susan Freiwald & Patricia L. R
Bellia, The Fourth Amendment Status of Stored E-mail: The Law Professors’ Brief in Warshak v.
United States, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 559 (2007) (describing Fourth Amendment arguments I
made with co-amicus in a stored e-mail case).
76. See Civil Liberties Amici, D.C. Brief, supra note 73, at 3 (“[T]he Court can and must R
require the government to meet the requirements to obtain a Rule 41 warrant before issu-
ing an order compelling the disclosure of stored CSLI.”); Public Defender, D.C. Brief,
supra note 74, at 1 (“Judge Lenihan’s conclusion . . . is the only resolution of the issues . . . R
that can protect the privacy rights of all citizens . . . .”); Freiwald, D.C. Brief, supra note 75, R
at 1 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment requires the court to affirm the magistrate
judge’s ruling).
77. CSI: Intermediate, 2008 WL 4191511, at *1 (holding that the magistrate judge’s order
was not clearly erroneous and therefore denying the government’s appeal).
78. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 7. R
79. Id. at 10–14.
80. Id. at 9–13; Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support
of Affirmance of the District Court at 1, CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No.
08-4227), 2009 WL 3866619 [hereinafter Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief].
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device, the records fell outside that provision’s purview.81  For both
sides, whether or not to characterize cell phones as tracking devices
with regard to location data did not detract from the fact that cell
phone providers provide electronic communications services, and that
location data is contained in “records pertaining” to that service.82
The Third Circuit eventually agreed.83
But while both sides agreed that law enforcement acquisition of
location data proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (the D order stan-
dard), they vehemently disagreed about what that standard means.
The crucial language of 2703(d) reads,
A court order for disclosure . . . may be issued by any court
that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only
if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the . . . records or other information sought, are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.84
The government argued that “shall issue” means that when an agent
presents sufficient information to obtain a D order to the magistrate
judge, the judge must grant the application for location data.85  The
Civil Liberties Amici, however, argued that “only if” meant that the
“relevant and material” standard sets a floor for disclosure, and that
judges could require more of a showing from the government, such as
81. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 9–13, 16–23; Civil Liberties Amici, R
Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 2 n.1 (finding the “tracking device” question irrele- R
vant).  I will not analyze this argument except to note that many magistrate judges have
agreed that location data does not fall under the non-contents provision of the SCA. See,
e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (“The definition contained in
[18 U.S.C.] § 3117, and incorporated into FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, compels the conclusion that
a cell phone is a tracking device when it is used to locate a person and track their move-
ments.”); CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602 n.44 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (collecting cases),
aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F. 3d 304 (3d
Cir. 2010).
82. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 26–27; Civil Liberties Amici, Third R
Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 2 & n.1, 7. R
83. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no dispute that
historical CSLI is a ‘record or other information pertaining to a subscriber . . . or cus-
tomer,’ and therefore falls within the scope of § 2703(c)(1).” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing 18 U.S.C § 2703(c)(1) (2006))).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
85. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 10 & n.9.  The federal public defender R
raised the question in its amici brief of whether the government had even satisfied the D
order standard in its original application. See Public Defender, D.C. Brief, supra note 74, at R
11 n.6 (suggesting that, “irrespective of the standard to be applied,” the court should re-
quire the Government to furnish “a more precise description” of the location data sought).
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probable cause, when needed.86  Both sides supported their argu-
ments with a detailed analysis of the statutory text87 and legislative
history.88
The Civil Liberties Amici urged the Third Circuit to construe the
statute as permitting magistrate judges to require probable cause in
some cases in order to avoid serious constitutional questions that
would be raised otherwise.89  Alternatively, the Civil Liberties Amici
argued that, were the Third Circuit to address the constitutional ques-
tion, it should hold that government acquisition of location data in-
trudes on an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy,
implicates the Fourth Amendment, and requires the protections of
the warrant requirement.90  But the Civil Liberties Amici emphasized
that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance should compel the court
to avoid the necessity of such a ruling.91
I did not address how to construe the statute in my brief to the
Third Circuit.92  Instead, I argued that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires government agents to obtain at least a warrant based on proba-
ble cause whenever they seek location data because those demands
are searches under the Fourth Amendment that intrude on targets’
reasonable expectations of privacy.93
As this brief synopsis illustrates, the interaction of statutory inter-
pretation and constitutional analysis may make CSI: Third Circuit seem
86. Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 4 (“By choosing the R
phrase ‘only if’ rather than simply ‘if’ . . . Congress made clear that a court may issue but is
not required to issue a D Order when the Government has made its specific and articulable
facts showing.”).
87. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 9–14 (arguing that the language of R
18 U.S.C.  § 2703 “unambiguously” grants the government the authority to request cell
user location information and no other statute limits that power); Civil Liberties Amici,
Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 4–7 (arguing that the plain language and the “Rule R
Against Superfluities” require a permissive reading of the statute).
88. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 11–12; Civil Liberties Amici, Third R
Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 7–8. R
89. Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 9–13 (“[I]f the Court R
adopts the Government’s mandatory reading, it will run headlong into serious constitu-
tional questions affecting the rights of every cell phone user.”).
90. Id. at 13–22.
91. See id. at 11–12 (“[W]hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to
adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice.  If one of them would raise a
multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail . . . .” (alteration in origi-
nal) (emphasis added) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005))).
92. Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Support of Affirmance, CSI: Third Circuit,
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 07-524M) [hereinafter Freiwald, Third Circuit Brief].
The public defender did not file a brief in CSI: Third Circuit.
93. Id. at 2–13.
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unreasonably complex.94  The core issue the case raises, however, re-
mains: What procedural hurdle(s) must government investigators
overcome before they may compel a cell phone service provider to
disclose location data?  To summarize, the government and two amici
suggested three ways to decide the case.  Under the government’s
view, magistrate judges must use the specific and articulable facts stan-
dard of Section 2703(d) of the SCA and are not permitted to require
that government agents make more of a showing before granting or-
ders for location data.  Under the Civil Liberties Amici view, magis-
trate judges may impose the D order standard but may require the
government to satisfy the more demanding probable cause warrant
standard when needed.  Under my view, which closely tracked the
lower courts’ view, magistrate judges must require agents to satisfy the
probable cause warrant standard before they may grant orders com-
pelling disclosure of location data.  As discussed, the majority in CSI:
Third Circuit chose the middle path, adopting the Civil Liberties
Amici’s reasoning and holding that magistrate judges retain the dis-
cretion, as a matter of statutory construction, to choose which stan-
dard to require.95
Before turning to the nature of location data, it makes sense to
understand what difference the standard makes, and what makes this
case different from prior cases.  Under a probable cause standard, the
information sought must itself be evidence of a crime.96  Some courts,
however, have construed the probable cause requirement more
broadly, finding the standard met when the target’s phone is used in
committing a crime or the target is to be arrested.97  Under a D order
standard, however, the government may seek any information that is
materially relevant to an ongoing investigation.  That would seem to
94. See Orin Kerr, Third Circuit Rules That Magistrate Judges Have Discretion to Reject Non-
Warrant Court Order Applications and Require Search Warrants to Obtain Historical Cell-Site
Records, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:23 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/08/
third-circuit-rules-that-magistrate-judges-have-discretion-to-reject-court-order-application-
and-require-search-warrants-to-obtain-historical-cell-site-records/ (describing it as “quite
tricky” to understand what the Third Circuit meant, and coming to a different conclusion
than this Article based on a different analysis of the Fourth Amendment precedents).
95. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 319 (“[T]he statute as presently written gives the
[magistrate judge] the option to require a warrant showing probable cause . . . .”).
96. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Pro-
spective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.D.C. 2006) [hereinafter CSI: DC] (not-
ing a difference in the standards because probable cause requires a finding that the
information sought is itself evidence of a crime rather than relevant and material to the
investigation).
97. See CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581–84 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (expressing skepti-
cism about some of the alternative interpretations of probable cause in other location data
contexts).
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permit acquisition of location data that will not yield evidence of
crime but that instead will yield information that will aid the investiga-
tion.98  The D order standard, then, permits much broader inquiries
into a much wider range of targets.  As mentioned, the target in CSI:
Third Circuit was not herself a suspect of a crime.99  According to the
magistrate judge’s opinion, the target of the application was the sub-
scriber of a cell phone apparently “used by” the suspect in a criminal
investigation, but the government “provid[ed] no specific information
connecting these two individuals, or connecting the Criminal Suspect
to the [target’s] cell phone.”100  The target may have been a friend or
associate of the criminal suspect or even someone whose phone the
suspect had stolen and used.101  Perhaps the government sought her
location information to yield other suspects or to learn more about
their activities, but not because the location information would itself
yield evidence of a crime.  Under the lower D order standard, the gov-
ernment has apparently conducted wide-ranging inquiries that have
yielded location data for a large number of suspects.102  Although the
ex parte and sealed nature of the government’s requests make under-
standing the full scope of such inquiries impossible,103 anecdotal evi-
98. See CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing the use of D
Orders to gain evidence that will merely lead to other evidence), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn,
736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No. 11; see also CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp.
2d at 585 (rejecting the government’s application because “tracking [the cell] phones
would [not] result in the discovery of evidence of a crime” and  would only “‘help yield
relevant evidence in this case.’”).
99. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 & n.11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (explaining that
the government sought her information “on the basis of its asserted relevance to an ongo-
ing criminal investigation of another individual”), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F. 3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
100. Id. at 588 n.11.
101. Would the magistrate judge have a basis to object if the information sought was
nonetheless relevant?
102. See Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 5 (describing a recent case in which the R
FBI sought and received tracking information, without a warrant, for 180 people in addi-
tion to the criminal defendant); see also id. at 6–7 (describing a cell phone provider’s web-
site dedicated to automatically providing law enforcement agents access to location data
records (citing Michael Isikoff, The Snitch in Your Pocket, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 2010, http://
www.newsweek.com/2010/02/18/the-snitch-in-your-pocket.html)).
103. See In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(d) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d
876, 894–95 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (limiting sealing of an order to 180 days, with possible re-
newal, so as not to violate the public’s First Amendment right of access); May Hearings,
supra note 14, at 32–33 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (expres- R
sing the need for transparency regarding government practices so the public “can assert
their rights”); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3
FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 208–12 (2009) (discussing the need for public knowledge of elec-
tronic surveillance cases and explaining that these cases have improperly remained under
seal indefinitely).
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dence suggests that use of the lower standard has facilitated much
more information gathering than the probable cause warrant stan-
dard would permit.  Such fishing expeditions run directly counter to
the Fourth Amendment’s core concern, which is preventing the use of
intrusive investigative techniques to obtain information about those
upon whom insufficient suspicion has fallen.104  Secret investigations
of those who will never find out because they will never be charged
with a crime also clearly violate due process.105
While many prior cases have addressed government access to lo-
cation data, most of them have concerned prospective data rather
than historical data.106  Over the last few years, dozens of federal dis-
trict courts have considered what procedural hurdles govern law en-
forcement compulsion of real-time or prospective location data from
cell phone service providers.107 While some cases have permitted law
enforcement access to the data without a warrant,108 many have not,
and have instead held that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant
104. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
801 (1994) (explaining that the core purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to enable only
“reasonable” searches); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98
MICH. L. REV. 547, 610–19 (1999) (explaining that the Framers’ original intent was to
prevent general warrants).
105. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 88 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. R
J.) (“[W]hen searches are shrouded in permanent secrecy, as in most cases of electronic
surveillance, due process becomes a dead letter.” (footnote omitted)); Crump & Calabrese,
supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that the current trend of sealing these orders violates the R
First Amendment and the common law right of access).
106. Despite this general trend, a few recent lower court cases have addressed historical
location data. Compare, e.g., CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at
*14 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2010) (finding a Fourth Amendment interest in location data), and
CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (same), with United States v. Ben-
ford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (finding no
Fourth Amendment interest), and United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/
AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (same).
107. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 93–94 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. R
Mag. J.) (categorizing all reported cell site decisions according to type of information
sought).
108. These cases have required both a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) and a pen
register order under 18 U.S.C. § 3123, a combination which has been called a “hybrid”
order. See Steven B. Toeniskoetter, Preventing a Modern Panopticon: Law Enforcement Acquisi-
tion of Real-Time Cellular Tracking Data, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, 24, 29 (2007), http://
law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13:4/article16.pdf (describing cases involving hybrid orders).
Courts have generally specified that they base their approval on the government’s repre-
sentations that the information sought is narrowly constrained; they generally do not pro-
vide a mechanism to ensure that the information the providers furnish stays so
constrained, and they provide no after-the-fact judicial review.  See infra Part III.B.2 for a
discussion of these rulings and an argument that courts should not defer to executive
branch self-restraint in cases of electronic surveillance.
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to obtain such forward-looking data.109  Some have permitted agents
to obtain forward-looking location data without a warrant but only
when the data sought is sufficiently limited in scope.110  Almost none
have generated appellate decisions.111 CSI: Third Circuit involved ac-
cess to stored, or historical, data only.112  Acquiring data out of stor-
age rather than in real-time means that different statutory provisions
apply, and a specific statutory prohibition against obtaining the data
too easily does not govern.113  The question is whether the distinction
that the SCA makes when it treats stored data as less worthy of protec-
tion than data acquired in real-time is of constitutional significance.  In
other words, does the Fourth Amendment distinguish between stored
and forward-looking data and deprive the former of the protection it
affords the latter?  The government says “yes,” largely because histori-
cal data means data stored by a third party service provider.114  As
discussed, the CSI: Third Circuit majority rejected the government’s
claim, and I elaborate on my agreement with the Third Circuit in Part
V.A.1.
CSI: Third Circuit also diverges from a line of cases involving ac-
cess to the contents of e-mail and text messages stored with the service
provider.  In those cases, although the government sought stored, his-
109. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 84 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. R
J.) (“Surveying the published opinions, it is fair to conclude that the majority held that
probable cause is the appropriate standard for government access to prospective cell site
information.”).
110. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms.
Records & Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter CSI: SDNY] (“If the Government seeks to obtain other infor-
mation, it should provide additional briefing on why such information is permissible under
the relevant authorities.”).
111. An exception is United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 951 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub
nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
112. 620 F.3d 304, 305 (3d Cir. 2010).
113. D orders may be used for historical data only because the statutory language refers
to “records.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expecta-
tions in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1566–67 (2004) (discussing the broad range of informa-
tion made accessible to law enforcement by the statutory language).  Prospective data ac-
quisition requires a pen register order. See generally, Toeniskoetter, supra note 108 R
(providing a thorough analysis of statutes and cases concerning access to location data in
real time).
114. Note that the government does not concede that prospective location data is con-
stitutionally protected either, but it does consistently argue that historical data lacks such
protection.  For example, the government’s standard application form specifies that by
providing probable cause, “the Government does not concede that such cell site
records . . .  may only be obtained via a warrant issued on probable cause.”  Standard
Affirmation in Support of Application, 2 n.1, available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/frees-
peech/18cellfoia_release_CRM-200800622F_06012009.pdf.
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torical data, it sought the contents of communications rather than lo-
cation data.  Those contents are most directly analogous to words
printed in letters or spoken in telephone calls, both of which receive
strong constitutional protection.115  Location information forms a
weaker analogy to letters and phone calls, in large part because of its
novelty.  Letters display addressing information on the outside of the
envelope and maintain the contents of the letter within.  Traditional
wire line telephone calls break down into telephone numbers dialed,
the contents of the call, and limited other associated data.116  But the
location of each cell tower with which your cell phone communicates
as you move from place to place (or stay in one place) creates an
entirely new type of data that does not neatly tie to more traditional
technologies.117
In recent years, federal appellate courts have addressed Fourth
Amendment protection for the contents of messages in electronic
storage.  In Warshak v. United States,118 the government asserted that a
white collar criminal defendant had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in several years’ worth of e-mails stored with his e-mail service
provider.119  A panel of the Sixth Circuit rejected the government’s
claim and held instead that the government generally needed to ob-
tain a warrant to compel disclosure of the e-mails because the defen-
dant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in them,
notwithstanding their storage with a third party.120  Although the
Sixth Circuit en banc vacated the panel’s decision and held that War-
shak lacked standing to obtain an injunction,121 the court revisited the
115. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects telephone calls); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (finding
that the Fourth Amendment protects sealed letters).
116. See generally Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy, supra note 75 (discussing the different at- R
tributes associated with telephone calls and their legal treatment).
117. For example, the government consistently calls location data “non-contents data,”
but that characterization is both too simplistic, see infra Part V.A.2, and in some cases,
clearly wrong, see May Hearings, supra note 14, at 30 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, R
Perkins Coie LLP) (noting that for some applications, location information must be seen
as “content” because “the user is conveying his or her location to another user essentially as
a communication—‘here I am’”).
118. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d
521 (6th Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 460–61, 478.
120. Id. at 480–82.  Along with Professor Patricia L. Bellia, I submitted an amicus brief to
the Sixth Circuit on behalf of Professors of Electronic Privacy Law and Internet Law.  Brief
for Professors of Electronic Privacy Law and Internet Law as Amici Curiae Supporting the
Appellee and Urging Affirmance, Warshak, 490 F.3d 455 (No. 06-4092), 2006 WL 4670944;
see also Freiwald & Bellia, supra note 75 (discussing Warshak and the amicus brief). R
121. Warshak, 532 F.3d at 523, 525–26 (vacating the judgment because Warshak’s claim
was “not ripe for judicial resolution”).  The en banc court suggested that Warshak should
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question after Warshak’s trial and affirmed the first panel’s finding
that users’ have a Fourth Amendment interest in stored e-mail.122
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., which the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision reversed and re-
manded, found that Quon retained a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of his text messages stored with a service
provider.123
As mentioned, the SCA, which is dramatically outdated by new
technology, clearly distinguishes between content data and non-con-
tent records and imposes lower procedural hurdles on government
access to the latter.124  The question is whether the SCA’s distinction
is of constitutional significance.  In other words, does the Fourth
Amendment deprive non-content data of protection while affording
protection to content data?  The government says “yes,” based on an
overly broad reading of Smith v. Maryland, which withheld Fourth
Amendment protection from the telephone numbers a target di-
aled.125  The CSI: Third Circuit majority rejected the government’s
claim, and I elaborate on my agreement with the Third Circuit in Part
V.A.2.
Instead of a short-cut version that relies either on a third-party
rule or a non-contents rule, a full Fourth Amendment analysis must
consider the reasonable expectations of privacy that cell phone users
have in their location data.126  That analysis requires an appreciation
of (1) how precisely the data may identify where the target has been
and (2) how fully the data allows agents to recreate the target’s private
life.  In the next Part, I address both of those questions by discussing
the power and intrusiveness of location data acquisition.
have tried to obtain damages by bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead. Id. at
532.
122. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in stored e-mail).
123. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–08 (9th Cir. 2008) rev’d
and remanded sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (finding that text
message users are entitled to privacy in their messages just as telephone callers are entitled
to the privacy of their telephone calls).
124. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)–(b) (2006), with id. § 2703(c).
125. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–46 (1979).
126. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (describing use of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test and attributing it to “Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence”
in Katz); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (establish-
ing the reasonable expectation of privacy test).  For an argument that the traditional rea-
sonable expectation of privacy analysis should be supplemented by a four-factor test that
considers the nature of the electronic surveillance at issue, see infra Part V.C.
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III. WHAT LOCATION DATA REVEALS
A. The Data’s Richness and Precision
The frequency and periodicity of a cell phone’s communications
with its cell towers determines how often the data refreshes.127  In
other words, a cell phone’s communication with cell towers deter-
mines how many data points there will be in a given time period.
Those data points can be used to paint a picture of where a target has
been during that period.  Each additional data point furnishes more
insight into where a person has gone, and as the data becomes more
finely grained, government officials can better determine when a per-
son has arrived and departed from each place and, accordingly, how
long he has remained there.  The more complete the picture the data
points provide, the more fully location data intrudes upon private ac-
tivities.128  The proximity of cell towers to each other contributes to
how accurately each data point will disclose the target’s location when
each data point, however often, is captured.129  Cell towers’ proximity
to each other determines the precision of the location data, which
also contributes to the nature of the activities that such data may dis-
close.  The more precisely one can identify where someone has been,
the more intrusive the information.  As I will discuss, however, copious
data from which one can draw inferences makes up for the lack of
precision of each data point.130
1. Location Data Richness—Periodicity
Cellular telephones send their communications by radio waves to
cell sites—transmitting stations in stand-alone towers or on other
buildings—that are strategically placed throughout the provider’s ser-
vice area.131  As a cell phone (and its user) moves from place to place,
the cell phone’s signal shifts from tower to tower to achieve the best
signal.  In order to determine which tower to use, the cell phone regu-
larly communicates with nearby towers to test the available signals.
When a user places or receives a call on his cell phone, the phone’s
radio transmitter must communicate with nearby cell towers so that
127. See infra Part III.A.1.
128. See generally CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SUR-
VEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007) (decrying law enforcement’s use of intru-
sive surveillance techniques in public places); Christopher Slobogin, Proportionality, Privacy,
and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1588 (2010) (describing the
principle of proportionality between intrusiveness of search and constitutional regulation).
129. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
130. See infra Part III.B.3.
131. See generally BEDELL, supra note 10 (offering a detailed explanation of the process). R
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the appropriate one (or ones) may handle the call.132  The cell phone
and the tower need to make these connections quite frequently.  Al-
though the frequency of such connections may vary by provider and
change over time, it appears that they are made as frequently as every
seven seconds.133  The question becomes: how frequently do such
connections generate records that providers retain?  The “periodicity”
of the location information,134 or how often it is refreshed and re-
corded, determines how finely grained the location picture will be.
a. Initiation and Termination Data
From cases that address location data, it appears that the govern-
ment always seeks and obtains initiation and termination data.  Initia-
tion data refers to the record of the nearest cell tower to the target
when a call begins, and termination data refers to such a record when
the call ends.  Some courts have distinguished between calls placed by
the target and calls the target receives on the ground that the former
represent more affirmative conduct by the target.135  Many courts,
however, have treated initiation and termination data the same.136  In
CSI: Third Circuit, for example, the government provided an “exem-
plar” in its filings and stated in its brief that its application requested
“the type of records shown in the record exemplar.”137  The exemplar
listed the date, time, and cell tower used at the beginning and end of
132. June Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor of R
Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania).
133. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 (W.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F. 3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see also
Thomas Farely & Ken Schmidt, Cellular Telephone Basics: Registration—Hello, World!, PRIVATE-
LINE (Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/vii_amps_call_processing/
a_registration (noting that during the “registration” process between a mobile phone and
available cell towers, “[t]he mobile re-scans every seven seconds or when signal strength
drops before a pre-determined level”).
134. See May Hearings, supra note 14, at 29 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins R
Coie LLP) (using the term “periodicity” to refer to “how frequently location information is
to be acquired during the course of a day” and noting the possibility that carriers could
report location information every fifteen minutes).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL
4200156, at *8–9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (noting that the government sought location
data for outgoing calls originated by the target, not incoming calls, and stating that “in
dialing certain numbers, the defendants . . . voluntarily agreed to turn over information
about which towers were being used in placing these calls”).
136. Courts have distinguished calls made by police to the target specifically to locate
the phone, from all other calls to or from the target. See infra Part III.A.1.b. (discussing
“pinging”).
137. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 32 n.17 (emphasis added).  The gov- R
ernment described the exemplar as “from the same wireless carrier from which the govern-
ment seeks to obtain records in this proceeding.” Id. at 8 n.6.
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each call, including both incoming calls to and outgoing calls from
the target.138
b. Data from Pinging
Some cases have further distinguished between calls made by the
target’s friends and associates and those made by the government in
order to generate a record that helps to locate the target.  When the
government calls the target’s cell phone, courts call it “pinging”139
(which is the same word that is used in the network context to signify
when one person uses a computer to determine whether another is
online).140  Some courts have permitted warrantless access to location
data only after noting that the government did not engage in ping-
ing.141  In the many other cases in which the creation of data by ping-
ing did not arise, there is no way to know whether the location data
sought nonetheless contained such records.142
c. Duration Data
Government agents in many cases have sought records of loca-
tion data that are generated during the call itself, rather than just at
its start and end.143  Duration data, or records of communications
with cell towers that take place during a call, provide further details
about a target’s movements or lack thereof.  For example, if the loca-
138. Id. at 8.  The exemplar also listed the identification number (“PTN”) of the caller
or called party and whether it was international, forwarded, inbound, or outbound.  Exem-
plar, Brief for the United States, supra note 44, Exhibit C. R
139. See, e.g., United States v. Forest, 355 F. 3d 942, 947, 951 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated sub
nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005); see also May Hearings, supra note 14, at R
22 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (“It is not uncommon for law
enforcement to ask for a phone to be pinged every 15 minutes.”).
140. See Dictionary of Computing: Packet InterNet Groper, WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY,
http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/Packet+InterNet+Groper (last visited Mar.
25, 2011) (explaining the meaning of the term “ping,” short for Packet InterNet Groper,
in the computer network context).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL
4200156, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (distinguishing Forest on the grounds that not only
did the government not seek government-created records but it also sought only those
records created when the targets initiated the calls themselves); In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace
Device, & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber & Other Info., 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418
(S.D. Tex. 2007) [hereinafter CSI: Houston II] (granting an order to obtain location data
after noting that there was no indication that the government sought to repeatedly place
calls to the target).
142. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing uncertainty regarding the content of location data
records).
143. See, e.g., CSI: DC, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 134, 140 (D.D.C. 2006) (rejecting an applica-
tion that sought data “if reasonably available, during the progress of a call”).
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tion data includes only initiation and termination information, then it
will reveal the nearest cell tower to the target when he starts an hour
long call and then when the call ends sixty minutes later.  If, however,
the location data is refreshed periodically during the course of the
call, then it will furnish information about where the target was
throughout the hour he spent on the telephone and provide informa-
tion about how long he stayed at each place.144  The government has
requested and apparently been furnished with duration data in sev-
eral location data cases, and courts have not tended to view the availa-
bility of that data differently from initiation and termination data.145
That seems odd given that duration data may significantly increase the
amount and richness of the data available.
d. Registration Data
Recording “registration data” creates an even more dramatic ex-
pansion in the quantity of data.  Cell phones generate registration
data whenever they communicate with cell towers, whether or not
they are engaged in a call.146  That way, when a call comes through,
the service provider’s network can quickly locate the phone and place
a call to it or from it through the nearest cell tower.  In fact, it appears
that the only way to stop the production of registration data is to block
the radio signal from the cell phone, which is not achieved solely by
turning the phone off, but requires further active intervention.147
Phone customers have little reason to disable the radio signal, unless
they are on a plane and specifically required to do so.  Thus registra-
tion data can be produced at small intervals twenty-four hours a
day.148  If that data were recorded and made available for a particular
target, it could create a picture made up of tiny dots that achieved a
144. See WAYNE JANSEN & RICK AYERS, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., GUIDELINES ON
CELL PHONE FORENSICS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY 63 (2007) (“A change of cell identifier between the beginning and the end of
a call, over a series of calls, may also indicate a general direction of travel or pattern of
behavior.”).
145. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 152. R
146. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor R
of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (“Cell phones periodi-
cally identify themselves to the nearest base station (that with the strongest radio signal) as
they move about the coverage area.”); JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 33–37 (discussing R
the difficulty of preventing a phone from sending out radio signals to cell towers).
147. See JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 33–37 (discussing “Airplane Mode” and other R
techniques used to block a cell phone’s radio signals).
148. Cell phones may be left on even when they are recharging. See CSI: Austin, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 571, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (expressing concern that “receipt of [location data]
will permit the government to ‘follow’ the phone user’s movements 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, wherever they go, whatever they are doing.”).
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virtual map of all the places the person went and how much time he
spent at each place along the way.149
As with the other types of data that determine its periodicity, re-
gistration data has turned up in cases that have considered the proce-
dural hurdles imposed on government access to location data.150
With rare exception, courts have not tended to discuss how much
more informative (and intrusive) location data becomes when it in-
cludes registration data.151  Although some decisions have granted or-
ders to obtain location data with the explicit understanding that the
location records sought would not include registration data, these de-
cisions have nonetheless permitted access to duration data.152  One
district court refused to permit access to registration data prospec-
tively, but had no problem granting access to historical registration
data without a warrant.153  The availability of registration and duration
data dramatically increases the richness of location information and
the intrusiveness of its acquisition.154
149. June Hearings, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Michael Amarosa, Senior Vice Pres- R
ident, TruePosition, Inc.) (describing the information furnished by location data as provid-
ing “definitive information relating to the size, detail, location and activity of illegal
conduct” that “can compile current activities, mobile events and interactions with other
devices” and “be viewed in a map-based graphic format.”).  The extent to which the cell
phone tower data revealed by the dots corresponds to the target depends on the data’s
precision, as I discuss in the next Part.  It may also be substantially enhanced by inferences,
as I discuss in Part III.B.3.
150. See, e.g., CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 29, 2010) (“[T]he Government seeks continuous location data to track the target
phone over a two month period, whether the phone was in active use or not.”); United
States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010)
(describing the information sought as data “identifying which cell tower communicated
with the cell phone while it was turned on”); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel.
Numbers, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 2005) (same); CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d
747, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same).
151. See, e.g., Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *1 (failing to discuss the fact that the applica-
tion sought data for whenever the target’s phone was on). But see CSI: Houston III, 2010 WL
4286365, at *7 (“Even if no calls or texts were ever made, the phone’s presence within the
home at a given time would likely be revealed by the automatic registration process.”).
152. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Installation
& Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 682–83 (W.D. La. 2006) [hereinafter CSI:
Shreveport]; CSI: SDNY, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
153. CSI: Houston II, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (describing “‘call-
detail records,’” to which the court granted warrantless access so long as the records were
historical, including location information “used by the phone to obtain service for a call or
when in an idle state.”).
154. See CSI: Houston III, 2010 WL 4286365, at *8 (“In this case, the records sought by
the Government are likely far more intrusive [than records for a single day]—not a single
snapshot at a point in time, but a continuous reality TV show, exposing two months’ worth
of a person’s movements, activities, and associations in relentless detail.”).
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The CSI: Third Circuit litigation suggests that courts may err when
they rely on government representations about the limits of the loca-
tion data they seek.  According to the majority’s decision, the govern-
ment’s application to the magistrate judge of the Western District of
Pennsylvania sought both duration and registration data.155  The ma-
jority quoted from the application, which appeared redacted in the
appendix, as seeking “historical cellular tower data . . . (including,
without limitation, . . . call handoffs, call durations, registrations and
connection records).”156  Yet, the government represented in its pa-
pers157 and at oral argument that it sought only initiation and termi-
nation information and not registration or duration data.158  In fact,
the government responded to a hypothetical at oral argument about
what location data would reveal during a journey from Washington,
D.C. to Philadelphia by stating that location data would be recorded
only when actual calls were placed.159  The magistrate judge found
that if registration data were provided, it would have furnished cell
tower records every seven seconds of that same trip.160  Duration data
would have furnished such information for each period during which
the target was on the cell phone.161  Whether the discrepancy between
the application and the government’s representations about it reflects
a misunderstanding162 about the application or a view that agents
155. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2010).
156. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 8 (citing the exemplar submitted to R
the district court as proof that the information sought by the government is limited to date,
time, telephone number, the cell tower used to connect to the call, the cell tower used at
the end of the call, and the duration of the call); Government’s Reply Memorandum of
Law in Support of Request for Review 3 n.2, CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-4227), 2009 WL 3866620 (claiming that the exemplar demonstrates that carriers
do not store “call handoff” data).
158. See Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 35:06–36:19 (arguing that location data in the R
exemplar was recorded only when calls were started or ended and points out that the
exemplar did not include registration data).
159. See id. at 35:04–35:28.
160. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that when-
ever cell phones are on, “registration” automatically “occurs approximately every seven
seconds”), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620
F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 133. R
161. See supra Part III.A.1.c.
162. Perhaps I misunderstand what the application means by “registrations” and “call
handoffs”; however, it is likely a service provider receiving an associated order would as-
sume that registration data is sought.
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would have asked for registration data but never received it,163 it does
suggest that courts rely on such representations at their peril.164
e. Data from Other Types of Communication
Thus far, I have focused on information associated with cellular
telephone calls without considering whether location data may also be
recorded when targets use their cell phones, and particularly smart
phones, to send and receive text messages, surf the Web, access
Facebook, check the news, or conduct any number of other interac-
tions with the Internet.  Even without smart phones, nearly all tradi-
tional cell phones currently support text messaging.165  A recent
cellular industry report indicates that, while cell phone use to make
telephone calls has remained relatively constant, cell phone use for
texting and browsing continues to increase sharply.166  As smart
phones become more popular than traditional cell phones, these
trends will only increase.167
Including location data for text messages and other types of com-
munications would have a dramatic impact on the richness of such
data.  According to a recent survey, carriers reported handling over
1.5 trillion text messages in 2009, a rate of nearly five billion text
messages per day.168  Consider the least rich category of location in-
formation: initiation and termination data.  If a target sent a text mes-
sage every fifteen minutes, then associated location data would reveal
cell tower information in fifteen minute intervals throughout the day.
The average teenager sends text messages at a much higher rate than
163. The government also indicated at oral argument that providers do not record or
collect registration data. See Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 23:00–25:00.  It seems logical R
that the government would not request registration data unless there was some chance of
receiving it.
164. Amici alerted the Third Circuit to the discrepancies between the redacted applica-
tion made available to them and the exemplar, but could not elaborate because, at the
time, the application had not been made public.  Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief,
supra note 80, at 11 & n.3; Freiwald, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 92, at 18 n.14. R
165. JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 10. R
166. See Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA—THE WIRELESS ASS’N, http://files.
ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_Midyear_2010_Graphics.pdf [hereinafter CTIA Survey] (on file
with the Maryland Law Review) (documenting that between 2008 and 2010 cell phone
minute usage remained relatively constant while text messaging increased by threefold).
167. See Eric Shutt, Google Outlines Mobile Trends at Advertising Week DC’s ADWKDC,
HUFFPOST TECH. (Sept. 24, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-shutt/
post_904_b_735621.html (according to Google Mobile Ads Senior Account Executive Elli-
ott Nix, “By 2011, smartphone use is projected to surpass that of today’s common feature
phone”).
168. Press Release, CTIA: The Wireless Ass’n, CTIA—The Wireless Association Announces
Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey Results (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.ctia.org/media/
press/body.cfm/prid/1936.
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that.169  If location data records are generated for text messages, let
alone Internet browsing sessions, such records are almost constantly
refreshed, even if registration data is not recorded.
In a recent case, the government’s application for location data
specifically requested data associated with text messages as well as cell
phone calls.170  As with the request for registration data, the fact that a
request for text messaging data has shown up in an actual application
strongly suggests that the government has received such information
in the past or at least believes there to be a significant chance that it
will be available in the future.  Indeed, industry observers have sug-
gested that as the cost of storing data continues to decrease and as
mobile applications develop quickly, companies have many incentives
to retain detailed location data.171
Between the availability of duration and registration data and the
possibility that location data will be recorded when cell phone users
send text messages or browse the Internet, it seems clear that location
data creates a much more detailed picture of a person’s movements
(or lack thereof) than has ever before been available to law enforce-
ment.172  To consider location data surveillance as raising the same
concerns as a policeman following someone on public streets is to fun-
damentally misunderstand the richness of the data and the power of
its use as a surveillance tool.173
169. See AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET AND AM. LIFE PROJECT, CELL PHONES AND AMER-
ICAN ADULTS 2 (Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/
Reports/2010/PIP_Adults_Cellphones_Report_2010.pdf (reporting study results that, on
average, adults send ten text messages per day and teenagers send fifty per day).
170. CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the applica-
tion as seeking location data “with respect to all calls and text messages to and from a
certain mobile telephone over a period of 58 days”), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F.
Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010), ECF No. 11.
171. June Hearings, supra note 14, at 27–28 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor R
of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (“Once the infrastruc-
ture to collect it is installed, the cost of collecting and storing high resolution location data
about every customer is relatively small, and such information is extraordinarily valuable
for network management, marketing, and developing new services.”); see also September Sen-
ate Hearings, supra note 49, at 78:10–79:35 (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice President R
for Public Policy, Center for Democracy & Technology) (commenting that the ability to
store information is at level not contemplated in 1986).
172. See Stephanie Lockwood, Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been?  Pri-
vacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
307, 312 (2004) (“The reality that people carry their cell phones on their persons means
that cell phone tracking technology potentially offers a detailed view of a given subscriber’s
movements rather than simply providing call-identifying information.”).
173. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the problematic analogy to traditional physical
surveillance.
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2. Location Data Precision
The precision of location data, or how small the area that it iden-
tifies the target as within, depends on how close together the cell tow-
ers are and on whether data about the cell tower face is provided.174
Triangulation techniques employ data about the receipt angle and
strength of communications signals, often from multiple towers, and
can increase location precision, as can the use of GPS data.175
a. Cell Tower Proximity and Cell Tower Face Data
If a cell phone communicates with cell towers that are stationed
one mile apart, then, all else being equal, data indicating communica-
tion with such a cell tower will indicate the target’s location with much
less precision than if the towers are placed fifty feet apart.176  As with
the other factors, the precision of the location data contributes to the
nature of the activities such data may disclose and therefore implicates
the constitutional analysis.
The proximity of cell towers varies by provider, by location, and
over time.177  Generally, cell towers are much closer to each other in
dense urban areas where they must handle a considerable volume of
calls than they are in rural areas where they carry a significantly lighter
load.178  Providers vary in how much they have “built out” particular
locations and, therefore, the placement and coverage their towers
provide.179  Historically, towers in cities have typically been placed
within a few hundred feet of each other, while in rural areas, and
particularly flat ones where the signals can travel without disruption,
towers can be miles apart.180  With providers adding towers to their
networks all the time, tower proximity in any particular place should
be increasing.181  According to recent congressional testimony by an
174. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
175. See infra Part III.A.2.b–c.
176. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 23–24 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Profes- R
sor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining that the
distance between cell towers determines the accuracy of the cell location data).
177. BEDELL, supra note 10, at 28–31. R
178. See, e.g., June Hearings, supra note 14, at 24 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Pro- R
fessor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining cell
tower bandwidth limitations as a reason for the proliferation of cell towers in urban areas).
179. See id. at 28 (describing cell phone carrier cell tower plans as utilizing various sector
configurations).
180. See JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 63 (describing variations based on locale and R
topography and noting that some rural cell towers are about twenty-one miles apart but
urban cell towers have limited coverage areas).
181. See CTIA Survey, supra note 166 (reporting that the number of cell sites in service R
increased forty percent in the last five years and had almost tripled in the last ten years);
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academic and scientific expert, new base technologies permit much
greater precision.182  As he testified to Congress,
The effect of this trend toward smaller sectors is that
knowing the identity of the base station (or sector ID) that
handled a call is tantamount to knowing a phone’s location
to within a relatively small geographic area. . . .  [I]n urban
areas and other environments that use microcells, this area
can be quite small indeed, sometimes effectively identifying
individual floors and rooms within buildings.183
Location data can reveal a target’s location with greater precision
when it includes information about the particular face (or sector) of
the cell tower that communicated with the target’s phone.  For in-
stance, consider the cell tower as the center of a pie, with the pie
divided into three slices and with each of three sectors sending out
signals into each of its corresponding pie slices.184  If it is known
which tower sector communicated with the target’s phone, the tar-
get’s location can be narrowed down by one-third.185  Instead of
merely knowing that the target was within 500 feet of a particular
tower as defined by a concentric circle, for example, you can know
that the target was more narrowly within the northern facing pie slice
and not within the pie slices to the tower’s southwest or southeast.186
Government investigators quite commonly request information about
cell sectors when they acquire location data, as they did in their appli-
cation in CSI: Third Circuit.187  Providers apparently store sector data
June Hearings, supra note 14, at 19 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor of Com- R
puter and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (“Wireless carriers have
strained to keep up with the explosive demand for cellular service, in many areas deploying
new infrastructure (most visibly cellular antenna towers) as quickly as they can find places
to put it.”).
182. June Hearings, supra note 14, at 24–25 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor R
of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (observing that “the
size of the ‘typical’ cell sector has been steadily shrinking”).
183. Id. at 25; see also id. at 28 (noting that even without GPS or triangulation, cell sector
information “in a dense urban environment with microcells . . . could identify a floor or
even a room within a building”).
184. See JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 8 (describing how sectors work). R
185. See Terrence P. O’Connor, Provider Side Cell Phone Forensics, SMALL SCALE DIGITAL
DEVICE FORENSICS J., June 2009, at 1, 4 (concluding that use of cell tower sectors may be an
accurate means of limiting a cell phone location to a 120 degree sector).
186. Id.
187. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting the government’s ap-
plication, which sought “sectors when available”).
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every time a call is made or received and every time the caller’s phone
moves to a new sector to get a better signal.188
b. Triangulation
Cell location data can achieve much greater precision when ana-
lysts use triangulation methods to virtually pinpoint a target’s location
in space.  Triangulation refers to a mathematical technique that in-
volves drawing lines from multiple sources and finding the point of
connection in the middle.189  Triangulators can use information
about changes in the strength of the communications signal over time
and its angle from the tower to the target.190  They can also use data
from overlapping cell towers, alone or in combination with angle and
signal strength data.191  Through whatever techniques, triangulation
data can reduce the area in which a target must have been from
within a concentric circle or pie slice radiating out from the tower to
approach the accuracy of GPS technology.192  A senior executive of a
company that uses triangulation of location information testified to
Congress that triangulation techniques have been used to locate illicit
cell phones in prisons and to locate missing children and wandering
adults with impairments such as Alzheimer’s.193  He lauded the relia-
bility and accuracy of triangulation information, and the fact that it
operates “transparent to the device user,” in that the user cannot “dis-
able[ ]” the production of triangulation data, as he can with GPS.194
In several recent cases in which lower courts have granted investi-
gators warrantless access to location data, their opinions have explic-
itly noted that the applications did not request multiple tower or
188. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor R
of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining the impor-
tance of accurate cell phone location data to a carrier’s decisions to alter existing infra-
structure); see also id. at 20 (describing the process by which calls are “handed off” between
cell towers to maintain the best radio signal).
189. See, e.g., id. at 38–42 (statement of Michael Amarosa, Senior Vice President for Pub-
lic Affairs, TruePosition, Inc.) (describing triangulation techniques using radio signal
strengths and timing differentials); BEDELL, supra note 10, at 311–14 (describing how dif- R
ferent triangulation techniques work and how they turn cell phones into tracking devices,
raising fears of “Big Brother”).
190. See Lockwood, supra note 172, at 308–09. R
191. Id. at 309.
192. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 29–30 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Profes- R
sor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (“The gap between
the locational precision in today’s cellular call detail records and that of a GPS tracker is
closing . . . .”).
193. Id. at 32 (statement of Michael Amarosa, Senior Vice President, TruePosition,
Inc.).
194. Id. at 44.
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signal strength data from which they could triangulate the targets’ lo-
cation.195  Courts apparently view triangulation, unlike some of the
other variables already discussed, as constitutionally significant.196
One court specifically held that the government may not acquire data
from which to triangulate on the lesser D order standard when the
government in fact sought such data.197  More recent cases may indi-
cate a trend toward the government seeking multiple tower data.198
c. GPS Data
One can pinpoint a target most efficiently using GPS data, which,
as one knows from Google maps and related applications, may indi-
cate a cell phone’s location down to a particular street address.199  In-
creasingly, smart phones come equipped with GPS locators so they
may take advantage of geo-location applications.200  Even traditional
cell phones, without Internet capabilities, now include GPS technol-
ogy so that providers may comply with federal regulations requiring
them to pinpoint locations during emergency calls.201  Some reported
cases reveal that government investigators have sought access to such
195. See, e.g., CSI: Houston II, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (noting that the
government did not indicate that it would use GPS and sought only single tower data); CSI:
SDNY, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (precluding the government’s receipt
of GPS or multitower data and noting that the government sought only single cell data).
196. See, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (reporting that
“there are no published decisions permitting multiple tower or GPS-based [location data]
without a showing of ‘probable cause’”).
197. See CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting the
government’s application for warrantless access to “information regarding the strength,
angle, and timing of the caller’s signal measured at two or more cell sites”).
198. See, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (“[T]he application here requests far
more than single tower data.”).
199. See, e.g., Letter from Bruce Sewell, Gen. Counsel & Senior Vice President of Legal
and Gov’t Affairs, Apple Inc., to Edward J. Markey and Joe Barton, U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives 6–7 (July 12, 2010) [hereinafter Apple Letter] (on file with the Maryland Law
Review) (describing use of GPS technology in iPhones and other devices to determine
precise locations); see also, e.g., June Hearings, supra note 14, at 21 (statement of Matt Blaze, R
Associate Professor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania)
(“GPS technology can achieve very high spatial resolution (typically within ten meters).”).
200. See, e.g., Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns
Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1061, 1063–66 (2010) (describing modern uses of GPS technology); Apple Letter,
supra note 199, at 4 (“[Location-based services] allow customers to perform a wide variety R
of useful tasks such as getting directions to a particular address from their current location,
locating their friends or letting their friends know where they are, or identifying nearby
restaurants or stores.”).
201. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2009) (requiring increasing accuracy of location information
through use of either network or handset-based technologies).
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GPS data recorded by cell phone service providers.202  Others have
specifically excluded GPS data from the location data government in-
vestigators could acquire.203  Just as with triangulation data, courts
have viewed GPS data as significantly more intrusive.204  The majority
opinion in CSI: Third Circuit noted that the government’s sample ap-
plication for location data, as furnished in its Department of Justice
manual, includes GPS data in the list of items the government may
request.205  Thus, the majority opinion expressed some skepticism of
the government’s claim that GPS data is not relevant to the analysis of
location data.206
In one recent case, government investigators requested compre-
hensive location data.  The district court quoted the government’s ap-
plication at length to highlight the extent of the government’s
request:
[L]ocation-based data that will assist law enforcement in de-
termining the exact location of the Target Devices (differentiated
from the first or last cell-site used to make or receive a call,
which simply identifies the location of the third party Pro-
vider’s infrastructure)[ ] . . . includ[ing] . . . the results
(through any means reasonably available) of any all [sic]
available location-based services, including but not limited to
real time cell-site data and those “Enhanced-911” services de-
veloped by the Providers to comply with the provisions of 47
C.F.R. § 20.18.207
202. See, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (stating that the
government application asked for “location-based data that will assist law enforcement in
determining the exact location of the Target Devices”).
203. See CSI: Shreveport, 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (W.D. La. 2006) (acknowledging that
the government did not seek available GPS information from the service provider and
refusing to authorize release of such information).
204. See supra note 196. R
205. 620 F.3d 304, 311 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP.
SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 222 (3d ed. 2009), available
at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf).
206. Compare id. at 311 (“Nonetheless, the Government does not argue that it cannot or
will not request information from a GPS device through a § 2703(d) order.”), with Oral
Argument, supra note 31, at 10:00–10:15 (government lawyer noting that the case had R
nothing to do with GPS data).
207. CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 579–80 (emphasis added by court); see also id. at 580
n.17 (explaining “Enhanced 911” requirements); June Hearings, supra note 14, at 33–37 R
(statement of Michael Amarosa, Senior Vice President, TruePosition, Inc.) (describing
evolution of “Enhanced 911” and services to meet the requirements).
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3. Uncertain Richness and Precision of Location Data
It is impossible to know for certain what location data cell phone
companies will turn over to law enforcement agents who compel its
disclosure.  Uncertainty about what location data would have been
produced in response to the government’s application apparently led
the majority in CSI: Third Circuit to withhold judgment as a matter of
law and remand for further fact finding.208  Not surprisingly, the
judges’ questions during oral argument indicated their unsatisfied cu-
riosity about the precision of the location data at issue.209  What the
judges missed, in both their questioning and the decision’s reasoning,
is that location data’s richness makes up for any lack of precision.210
In addition, given the ambiguity of the statute and the need for the
judiciary to rein in law enforcement practices, a warrant based on
probable cause should be required in all cases.211
The above discussion establishes that location data contains a
wealth of information that, even in its most basic forms, law enforce-
ment can use to paint a fairly complete portrait of the target’s private
life.  The more data collected and the more precise that data, the
more location information furnishes a virtual map of our movements
and activities.  In fact, according to an academic and scientific expert,
“Some carriers also store frequently updated, highly precise, location
information not just when calls are made or received, but about every
device as it moves about the networks.”212  In addition to the potential
of providing current or future location applications, carriers may store
location information to manage their networks and to improve their
208. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 313, 319 (“We therefore cannot accept the [magis-
trate judge’s] conclusion that [location information] by definition should be considered
information from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires probable cause for its
production.”).
209. Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 26:26–27:45 (Judge Sloviter asking how close the R
cell towers are to the caller’s cell phone); id. at 33:00–34:15 (Judge Tashima questioning
the government lawyer about density of cell towers); id. at 51:40–52:00 (Judge Tashima
questioning EFF lawyer, Kevin Bankston, about how closely location data can track the
target); id. at 1:07:44–56 (Judge Tashima asking me a similar question regarding how
closely location data can track the target).
210. See infra Part IV (discussing reasons not to limit constitutional protection to the
inside of the home).
211. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the need not to rely on law enforcement self-
restraint).
212. June Hearings, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor of R
Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania); see also id. (“[A]s even
more precise location information becomes available, these records can now also include
the customer’s latitude and longitude along with the sector ID stored in cellular carrier
databases.”).
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infrastructures.213  As the cost of storage goes down and the use of
location applications continues, we should expect more storage of
ever more precise data.214
Government litigators respond to concerns about location data
by arguing that the data is too limited, and the picture it paints too
vague, to implicate constitutional rights.215  Before turning to the le-
gal argument, I explore in the next Section three factual reasons why
courts should reject the government’s contentions about the limits of
location data.
B. Location Data: Illegitimate Limits
Courts should reject the government’s argument that location
data is too limited to implicate the Fourth Amendment for three rea-
sons.  First, reviewing courts should not assume that the data providers
disclose will be as limited as the data law enforcement requests, or
purports to request.216  Second, because the D order provision does
not distinguish between precise and imprecise location data, if the
government may use it, they may acquire, without a warrant, whatever
location data is available, which is surely growing over time.217  Be-
cause providers have no statutory obligation to filter location data, the
government effectively asks the courts to trust it to self-censor and re-
quest only location data that does not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment.218  Foundational constitutional principles require that the
213. See, e.g., id. at 27–28 (“By tracking more precisely where each mobile device is lo-
cated within a sector . . . a carrier can better identify where new infrastructure is required,
where old infrastructure is redundant, and how and where their customers use different
wireless services.”).
214. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“Maintaining such detailed records about the locations of phones
as they move from place to place makes good engineering sense, and we should expect this
trend to continue as part of the natural progression of technology.”).
215. See, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (describing the
government’s argument as claiming that the location information it seeks does not require
probable cause “because it cannot precisely locate the phone user”); Brief for the United
States, supra note 44, at 26–35 (arguing that subscribers have no Fourth Amendment inter- R
est in location data because the information does not reveal precise locations).
216. See infra Part III.B.1.
217. See infra Part III.B.2; see also, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 579 n.15 (“And
there is nothing in any of the relevant statutes that makes a distinction between ‘limited’
location information and fully robust, minute-by-minute location information.”); In re Ap-
plication of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain
Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing precision of multi-
ple tower information and observing that if the statutory provisions that do not require a
warrant “authorize the disclosure of cell site information from a single antenna tower,
there is no reason to believe that they would not authorize disclosure of such information
from multiple antenna towers simultaneously”).
218. See infra note 245 and accompanying text. R
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courts not trust executive branch agents to police themselves; a war-
rant requirement is needed to ensure that zealous agents in the field
do not exceed constitutional limits.219  That is especially so when, be-
cause they have operated under a less demanding relevance standard,
agents apparently have been requesting location data for a large num-
ber of targets with only a tenuous connection to crime.  Finally, the
intrusive nature of location data is enhanced by the government’s abil-
ity to use it to draw inferences about a target’s personal movements
and activities.220
1. Applications Do Not Necessarily Dictate Results
One cannot assume that the information law enforcement re-
quests will match the information that service providers disclose.  For
example, the exemplar the government provided in the CSI: Third Cir-
cuit litigation did not appear to be a customer bill—it had none of the
trappings of a communication with a customer, such as the sub-
scriber’s name, account number, or address—but rather appeared to
be a report the provider drew from a database of raw location data.221
The exemplar was identified as the first of fifty-four pages and listed
the time and date the report was created.222  Although we cannot
know how much, the underlying location data stored by the provider
could actually have been much more extensive.223  In other words,
even if the exemplar suggested that the targeted provider collects the
information listed there, it does not establish that the provider would
provide no more.  To the extent service providers retain more than
the limited subset of location data the government purports to seek,
there would be neither reason nor way for providers to filter the data
in order to deliver only limited data.224  As mentioned above, the
profit motive should impel providers to make disclosure decisions
219. See infra Part III.B.2.
220. See infra Part III.B.3.
221. See Exemplar, Brief for the United States, supra note 44, Exhibit C, Document 11-4. R
222. Id.
223. See CSI: SDNY, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the provider
digitally transmitted stored cell site data to the government, which “then use[d] a software
program to translate that data into a usable spreadsheet”).
224. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1) (2006) (clarifying that law enforcement may not compel
or prohibit service providers from using any particular equipment or technology to comply
with Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”)); see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas to Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 355, 359 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(describing how in using “toll records” in the SCA, Congress intended to “make certain
that the providers of electronic communication services were not required to create
records not kept in the ordinary course of business”).
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based on the lowest cost rather than to decide based on the best inter-
ests of the target.225
In a related context, for example, the Communications Assis-
tance for Law Enforcement Act requires that law enforcement agents
do more than obtain a pen register order to acquire location data in
real time.226  Despite the clear prohibition against it, providers
presented with only pen register orders apparently fail to filter out
location data because it is just too costly to do so.227  Instead, accord-
ing to one industry lawyer, whenever providers receive a pen register
order, they also provide location data: “The location information is
just flowing as part of the solution.”228  Even without seeking it, then,
law enforcement agents will likely receive more location data than
they request.  As discussed above, that information can include dura-
tion, registration, triangulation, and GPS data, all of which can pro-
vide an extremely rich and precise picture of a target’s movements.229
Exacerbating the problem, providers do not collect and retain
location data solely on their own initiative, but also in anticipation of
law enforcement requests.230  Private companies share a strong inter-
est in cooperating with law enforcement agents in their pursuit of
crime.231 Service providers have an incentive to satisfy rather than an-
noy government investigators, and if they suffer no penalty for over-
225. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 590 n.20 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (describing pro-
vider as the one making decisions about what location data to retain based on an interest
in keeping costs down and complying with government demands), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see also
Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy, supra note 75, at 1010–13 (questioning the calculation that R
equates service provider interests with subscribers’ privacy interests, particularly when sub-
scribers will not find out about disclosures).
226. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
227. See Albert Gidari, Jr., Keynote Address, Companies Caught in the Middle, 41 U.S.F. L.
REV. 535, 549–50 (2007).
228. See id. at 550 (“[Service providers] are paying a fortune for the CALEA hardware
and software, and they are not paying to filter it further.”).
229. See supra Part III.A.1–2.
230. Magistrate Judge Lenihan pointed out that companies retain data for law enforce-
ment’s benefit in her decision. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (“Nor does a [pro-
vider’s] retention of [location data] generally serve any business purpose for the customer
or for the provider in serving the customer; rather, such information is retained princi-
pally, if not exclusively, in response to Government directive.”); see also June Hearings, supra
note 14, at 86–87 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (“[W]hat about histori- R
cal [location data] that is captured only at the instigation of law enforcement, and for
which the provider has no legitimate business reason to generate or maintain on its own.”).
231. See, e.g., ECPA Reform and the Revolution in Cloud Computing: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 28–29 (2010) (statement of Michael Hintze, Associate General Counsel,
Microsoft Corporation) (describing Microsoft’s extensive efforts to cooperate with law
enforcement).
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disclosing, they will disclose what is most convenient and likely to
comply rather than withholding data on principle.232  Although the
ex parte and usually sealed nature of government applications makes
them exceedingly difficult to research,233 requests for location data
have apparently been quite extensive.234  In one recent case, which
the district court took the unusual step of unsealing, the court noted a
discrepancy between the extremely precise location data that the gov-
ernment’s application sought, and the “boilerplate” footnote on its
application that suggested it was seeking much more limited data.235
In general, there are thousands of wireless service providers who
undoubtedly collect and retain different amounts and types of loca-
tion data.236  Efforts to have the major service providers disclose their
collection and retention policies have proved fruitless in the past, as
companies may consider such information to be trade secrets.237  A
recent congressional hearing on the need to update the electronic
surveillance laws that focused on location data, however, has brought
more information to light than was previously available.  In particular,
testimony revealed that the precision of location data has increased
dramatically, even without the use of either triangulation or GPS tech-
nologies.  Both of those technologies, of course, are becoming in-
232. See 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) (2006) (providing broad service provider immunity for co-
operation with law enforcement when they submit documentation in support of their re-
quests); see also id. § 2712(c) (providing only for administrative discipline for law
enforcement agents who violate SCA provisions).
233. See Bankston, supra note 72, at 605–06 (discussing the secrecy involved in ex parte R
cases); Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 3, 4–5 (describing the need to issue Freedom R
of Information Act requests to obtain information about location data cases, because they
were filed under seal “ ‘until further order of the Court’” and conducted ex parte (quoting
In re Sealing & Non-Disclosure of Pen/Trap/2703(D) Orders, 562 F. Supp. 2d 876, 878
(S.D. Tex. 2008))); see also Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that the lawyers R
were able to obtain information from only the few federal districts with which they en-
gaged in Freedom of Information Act litigation).
234. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 80 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. R
J.) (estimating that the total number of electronic surveillance orders issued at the federal
level exceeds 10,000 per year); May Hearings, supra note 14, at 23 (statement of Albert R
Gidari Jr., Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (“The number of user records requested on a daily
basis is astronomical.”); Gidari, supra note 227, at 554 (discussing the magnitude of govern- R
ment requests for information).
235. CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 579 (W.D. Tex. 2010).  See supra text accompany-
ing note 207 for the text of the government’s request. R
236. See June Hearings, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Professor R
of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (explaining that “each
carrier has its own data collection and retention practices”); Gidari, supra note 227, at 550 R
(reporting that in 2007 there were “at least 3500 registered carriers in this country” and
“another 1300 wireless companies”).
237. Thanks to John Shafer, USF Research Librarian, for help pursuing this
information.
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creasingly common with the advent of smart phones.  As each
individual data point is more and more informative, private compa-
nies collect more and more data, and both trends should only con-
tinue.  As a result, whether it was true in years past that the location
information itself was not informative or that the informative data
would not show up in provider records, neither fact appears to be true
any longer.238
2. Law Enforcement Self-Restraint
Whatever location data may be available, in CSI: Third Circuit the
government urged the court to consider only the circumscribed set of
location data it purportedly requested in its application.239  When the
government argues that the limited nature of its location data re-
quests insulates those requests from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, it
essentially asks courts to rely on agents’ own self-restraint to protect
Fourth Amendment rights.240  But law enforcement agents may not
avoid the application of the Fourth Amendment by asserting that they
themselves will limit their review of location data and that they may do
so without meaningful judicial oversight.241  The applicable statutory
provision places no limits on the information available with a D order
if the Fourth Amendment does not apply.242  As the majority recog-
nized in CSI: Third Circuit, when considering law enforcement surveil-
lance methods, courts must take the inevitable growth of the
technology into account.243  Just ten years ago, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the constitutionality of surveillance should be
238. See, e.g., June Hearings, supra note 14, at 27 (statement of Matt Blaze, Associate Pro- R
fessor of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania) (describing how
providers are recording more location data, and that information is more intrusive now).
But see June Hearings, supra note 14, at 63–64 (statement of Richard Littlehale, Assistant R
Special Agent in Charge, Technical Services Unit, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation)
(complaining that new technologies are making it harder to get access to information and
presaging government demands for greater access).
239. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 7, 9 (focusing on the records R
“requested”); Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 30:25–30:34 (the government lawyer argu- R
ing that Fourth Amendment determinations must be made on the facts before the court);
Oral Argument, supra note 32, at 50:20–50:31, 50:56–51:16 (Judge Tashima expressing re- R
sistance to issuing an “advisory opinion” based on facts not before the court).
240. Freiwald, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 92, at 22–23, 25. R
241. Oversight under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) includes neither probable cause justification,
meaningful remedies for misuse, nor judicial oversight of the monitoring, once begun.
242. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 11–12 (recognizing that the lan- R
guage in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1) is a “catch-all category” designed to include any informa-
tion that a service provider stores that is “ ‘pertaining to’” a subscriber of an electronic
communication service).
243. 620 F.3d 304, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36
(2001)); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (“While the technology used in the present case was
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judged on the basis of what occurred in the case at bar and instead
required courts to “take the long view” and give “clear specification of
those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”244
Moreover, if courts were to rely on the government’s representa-
tion that executive branch agents will not seek data that implicates the
Fourth Amendment, they would permit those agents to take on for
themselves the oversight role the Constitution entrusts solely to the
members of the judiciary.245  The Supreme Court soundly rejected a
similar request more than forty years ago in the famous Katz246 deci-
sion in which it first determined that the Fourth Amendment regu-
lates wiretapping:
The Government urges that, because its agents . . . did
no more here than they might properly have done with prior
judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their con-
duct.  That we cannot do.  It is apparent that the agents in
this case acted with restraint.  Yet the inescapable fact is that
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a
judicial officer.  They were not required, before commenc-
ing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause
for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.  They were not
compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to ob-
serve precise limits established in advance by a specific court
order.  Nor were they directed, after the search had been
completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of
all that had been seized.247
Trusting the government to curb its own appetite for increasingly
intrusive location data would run counter not only to constitutional
principles but also to experience.  For example, as pen registers
evolved from devices that recorded telephone numbers into devices
capable of recording ever richer data, law enforcement agents de-
manded the ability to use them without satisfying more than the mini-
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that
are already in use or in development.”).
244. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
245. According to one court, agents limit their requests specifically to avoid constitu-
tional confrontations. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Installa-
tion & Use of Pen Register, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (outlining a
conversation between the court and the government lawyer during oral argument in which
the latter described how agents refrain from asking for all possible data so as not to alarm
magistrate judges).
246. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
247. Id. at 356.
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mally demanding requirements Congress established in 1986.248  In
the latest installment of this story, law enforcement agents advocated
the right to obtain post-cut-through dialed-digits with a pen register
order, despite the fact that those digits often contain content, on the
ground that service providers are unable to filter out the non-contents
data.249  “Post-cut-through dialed digits” generally refer to digits di-
aled after the first ten (phone number digits) and may include bank
account numbers, social security numbers, and prescription num-
bers.250  Courts have quite properly refused to allow law enforcement
agents to segregate the data themselves.251
With regard to location data, law enforcement agents have shown
that they will not limit themselves. ACLU lawyers obtained informa-
tion pursuant to Freedom of Information Act requests that suggests
that agents in the field regularly violate Department of Justice guide-
lines and request the most precise location data without first ob-
taining a warrant.252  The Associate Director of the Office of
Enforcement Operations wrote several memos explaining to agents
that they should establish probable cause when seeking prospective
records that would divulge location data indicating a target’s latitude
and longitude (using either GPS or “similarly precise” data).253  None-
theless, the ACLU discovered that in one U.S. Attorney’s Office,
nineteen applications in which agents requested “GPS or similarly pre-
cise location data without a judicial determination of probable cause”
248. See Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy, supra note 75, at 982–89 (discussing the evolution of R
“pen register,” which has led to “government lawyers press[ing] for an open-ended and
functional definition” that includes “computer system[s]”).
249. In re U.S. for Orders (1) Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers & Trap & Trace
Devices, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 332 & n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) [hereinafter PCTDD: EDNY].
250. Id. at 328.
251. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & a Trap & Trace Device on Wireless Tel., No. 08 MC 0595(JO), 2008 WL
5255815, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008) (denying application if government would segre-
gate the data itself, as violative of the statute); PCTDD: EDNY, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (find-
ing government segregation of data to violate Fourth Amendment); In re Application of
the U.S. for an Order Authorizing (1) Installation & Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace
Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, & (3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F.
Supp. 2d 816, 827 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
252. See Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 4. R
253. See, e.g., E-mail from Mark Eckenwiler, Assoc. Dir., Office of Enforcement Opera-
tions, Criminal Div., to CHIPs (Nov. 16, 2007, 3:19 PM), available at http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/freespeech/18cellfoia_release_CRM-200800622F_06012009.pdf (page 80); E-mail
from Mark Eckenwiler, Assoc. Dir., Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Div., to All
USAEO Criminal Chiefs (Sept. 12, 2008, 2:38 PM) (on file with author).  Note that the
government does not concede that probable cause is required. See supra note 114. R
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were granted in about a one year period.254  In another office, judges
granted six such applications.255  There is no way to know what goes
on at other offices that did not provide information, but these applica-
tions indicate that officials can neither control nor speak for the ac-
tions of their agents in the field.256  Accordingly, representations
based on “official policy” cannot be relied upon as what is happening
in reality.
As discussed, a mere relevance and materiality standard permits
law enforcement agents to obtain location data and make inferences
from it about those who have only tenuous connections to crimes.
The government apparently seeks location information about ostensi-
bly innocent parties regularly.  According to an industry lawyer, “With
respect to location information of specific users, many orders now re-
quire disclosure of the location of all of the associates who called or
made calls to a target.”257  Agents apparently request information on
all calls handled by a particular cell tower.258  At oral argument, a
member of the CSI: Third Circuit panel expressed concern about the
government’s attempt to determine the identity of callers using cell
location data.259  If law enforcement agents could acquire location
data, without a warrant, about people so tenuously connected to
crimes, then more than two hundred and ninety million Americans
254. Letter from William G. Stewart II, Assistant Dir., FOIA/Privacy Unit, to Catherine
Crump, Request No. 07-4132 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/frees-
peech/cellfoia_released_074132_12312008.pdf.
255. Letter from William G. Stewart II, Assistant Dir., FOIA/Privacy Unit to Catherine
Crump, Request No. 07-4135 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/frees-
peech/cellfoia_released_074135_12312008.pdf.
256. See Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 4 (“Because the FOIA focused on only a R
small number of U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country, it may well be that many other
offices also do not follow DOJ’s recommendation.”).
257. See Gidari, supra note 227, at 557. R
258. See May Hearings, supra note 14, at 29–30 (statement of Albert Gidari, Partner, Per- R
kins Coie LLP) (describing a common practice of government agents seeking the “location
[information] of the community of interest—that is, the location of persons with whom
the target communicates”); JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 63 (describing as a possible R
search criterion “all calls handled by a base station responsible for a particular cell”);
Crump & Calabrese, supra note 8, at 7 (“[I]t appears that the government took the dragnet R
approach of getting location information for a large number of innocent people to try to
figure out who was involved in the crime.”).
259. See Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 13:45–14:15 (Judge Sloviter questioning the R
government lawyer about what the government is “trying to get at” with “its interpretation
of the statute” and specifically inquired about identity information); see also id. at
28:00–29:50 (Judge Sloviter expressing concern about government interest in attendance
at political meetings or protests and acquisition of location data without a warrant to deter-
mine who attended).
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who use cell phones are at risk of location data surveillance.260  That
risk justifies the judicial oversight that a warrant requirement
guarantees.
3. Inferences
In its arguments before the Third Circuit, the government re-
peatedly implied that the Fourth Amendment is implicated only when
acquisition of location data pinpoints a target’s physical location in a
space that exactly matches an area previously identified as his home or
other constitutionally protected space.  For example, the government
argued that the location data in the case was “much too imprecise to
tell whether calls have been made or received from a constitutionally
protected space, let alone to reveal facts about the interiors of private
homes or other protected spaces.”261  The next Part addresses the gov-
ernment’s unduly narrow view of the spaces the Constitution protects,
which the Third Circuit unfortunately seemed to adopt.  But here I
discuss how location data can intrude on privacy by facilitating infer-
ences, in addition to directly providing pinpoint data.
The majority in CSI: Third Circuit properly recognized the possi-
bility of inferring “private” facts about the target through his location
data.262  As the majority also recognized, information gained from in-
ference can be just as intrusive as information gained directly.263  In
Kyllo v. United States,264 the Supreme Court rejected the “dissent’s ex-
traordinary assertion that anything learned through ‘an inference’
cannot be a search.”265
Even when they do not know the target’s home address, agents
can likely figure out when a target was home using his location data
and simple inferences.266  For example, the target will likely use his
cell phone regularly from his home in the morning, evening, and
weekend hours.267  Law enforcement agents should be able to infer,
260. See CTIA Survey, supra note 166 (reporting an estimated 292,847,098 cellular sub- R
scriber accounts in the United States at the end of June 2010).
261. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 35. R
262. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 311–13 (3d Cir. 2010).
263. Id. at 312.
264. 553 U.S. 27 (2001).
265. Id. at 36.
266. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 311–12.
267. In fact, many users have replaced their landline phones with cell phones, which
they use to make and receive all calls. See DAVID KRANE & KERRI MILLER, HARRIS INTERAC-
TIVE, THE HARRIS POLL #36: CELL PHONE USAGE CONTINUES TO INCREASE (Apr. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Cell-
Phone-Usage-Continues-to-Increase-2008-04.pdf (finding that thirty-two percent of Ameri-
cans ages 18 to 29 and fourteen percent of all adults exclusively used cell phones).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-3\MLR303.txt unknown Seq: 45  5-MAY-11 15:36
2011] A QUESTION OF LAW, NOT FACT 725
from data covering a fairly short time frame, when the target was mak-
ing and receiving calls from home.  Agents can then identify which
cell tower and sector is closest to the target’s home.268  Once they
identify that cell tower and sector,269 the agents can determine when-
ever the target was likely in his home.270  In addition, law enforcement
agents might use the incoming and outgoing telephone numbers,
along with the duration of those calls, to identify the target’s presence
at other places of interest and to infer information about his activities
while there.271
Besides, under law clearly established by the SCA, law enforce-
ment agents can acquire “subscriber information” about a target with-
out obtaining a warrant, by procuring only a D order from a judge
that meets the “relevant and material” standard.272  That information
may yield the target’s home address, credit card information, Internet
account information, telephone number, and the numbers dialed by
his telephone.273  Consequently, without a warrant, agents may find
out where a target lives and his telephone number even before they
obtain his location data.  Equipped with that knowledge, location data
that shows the target’s cell phone communicated with the cell tower
closest to his home indicates that the target was likely at home and on
the telephone during that time.274
Location data has furnished law enforcement with investigatory
and prosecutorial value in the past several years.  Prosecutors have
used the data, even when fairly “imprecise,” to connect targets to
268. In addition to divulging information about actual calls, if location data was re-
corded whenever the telephone was powered on, then the information would quickly di-
vulge when a target was home because it would show the telephone on in the same place
for long periods (for example, sleeping hours) that would correspond to the time the
target was home.
269. Presumably, one could figure this out using merely a tower without associated sec-
tor information.
270. See JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 63 (“Identifying the geographical coverage of R
specific cells can provide valuable information when combined with call detail records,
geographically establishing plausible locations with some degree of certainty for the times
involved.”).
271. See, e.g., id. at 63–64 (explaining how to analyze “the patterns and content of com-
munications” to determine ownership of prepaid phones despite a target’s attempts to
evade discovery).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
273. See JANSEN & AYERS, supra note 144, at 62 (providing a complete listing of subscrib- R
ing information typically available from service providers).
274. See June Hearings, supra note 14 at 86, (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. R
J.) (“For instance, when law enforcement already knows the business and residential ad-
dresses of the target (or the target’s family, friends, and associates), a single phone call
signal captured from a single tower may be all that’s needed to reliably pinpoint a target’s
exact location at a given time.”).
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crime scenes and to disprove alibis.275  In making their cases, prosecu-
tors have used inferences to enhance the value of location data that is
otherwise not very precise.276
The richness and precision of the data, the reasons to believe
providers will disclose more than what they are asked for, and the like-
lihood that government agents will be unable to restrain themselves
from over-collecting, mandate the protections of the warrant require-
ment.  Individuals particularly need the protections of the warrant re-
quirement because of the inferences that location data permits one to
draw about their movements and activities, the possibility of which the
majority in CSI: Third Circuit recognized.277  Nonetheless, the majority
remanded the case to the magistrate judge to determine whether a
warrant was in fact required, leaving open the distinct possibility that
the government could compel disclosure of the wealth of location
data on the minimal protections of the D order.278  The explanation
lies in part on the majority’s narrow interpretation of the protection
offered by the bumper-beeper cases, to which I next turn.
IV. LOCATION DATA AND THE HOME
A. The Bumper-Beeper Cases: Knotts and Karo
In cases like CSI: Third Circuit, the government has contended
that courts must read two bumper-beeper precedents from the 1980s
to deny Fourth Amendment protection to location data derived from
cell phone providers.279  In particular, the government has asserted
that United States v. Knotts280 establishes that “there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in cell-site information.”281  The government
maintains that because cell tower “records provide only a very general
indication of a user’s whereabouts at certain times in the past, the
275. See, e.g., People v. Pese, No. A100933, 2004 WL 899768, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
28, 2004) (involving location data that connected defendant to the place where the vic-
tim’s body was found); O’Connor, supra note 185, at 4 (describing use of location data to R
disprove alibi in a criminal investigation); Lockwood, supra note 172, at 310–11 (furnishing R
more examples of law enforcement use of cell phone location data).
276. See Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 14–19; see also id. at R
exhibit A (providing expert testimony from a case where location data was used to infer
when the target was at home and at the home of another person).
277. 620 F.3d 304, 312–13 (3d Cir. 2010).
278. Id. at 319.
279. See, e.g., id. at 312–13 (finding that the bumper-beeper precedents “make clear that
the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home”); United States v.
Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *9–11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,
2008) (using the bumper-beeper precedents to deny a Fourth Amendment challenge).
280. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
281. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 28–29 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282). R
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requested [location] records do not implicate a Fourth Amendment
privacy interest.”282
Knotts, decided in 1983, had nothing to do with location data
gleaned from use of cell phones.  It addressed the government’s mon-
itoring of a radio beeper attached to a large container of chemicals
stored in an automobile that government agents followed “on public
streets and highways.”283  Several meaningful differences between lo-
cation data and the data divulged by the beeper in Knotts undermine
the case’s relevance for location data.284
First, agents affixed the beeper in Knotts to a five-gallon drum of
chloroform and monitored the drum rather than the individual sus-
pects.285  If those surveillance targets had been separated from the
drum for any reason, the monitoring would have ceased to be effec-
tive.  Unlike five-gallon drums of chloroform, cell phones generally
travel with the user and are often on the user’s person.  Indeed, mod-
ern cell phones include many features that tempt users to have them
at hand all the time.286  Thus, the beeper monitoring the Supreme
Court considered in Knotts was considerably less intrusive, by virtue of
being considerably less reliable, than that afforded by acquisition of
location data.287  According to one recent decision, “The level of in-
formation obtained from [traditional] tracking devices was thus akin
to (and indeed, less precise than) what law enforcement agents today
can know about a modern cell phone user’s location from informa-
tion from a single cell tower,” even without triangulation or GPS
information.288
Second, agents often obtained a warrant before installing the
type of beeper used in the mid-1980s; that initial hurdle limited the
use, and therefore possible abuse, of beepers.289  Thus, the Supreme
Court had to consider whether beeper monitoring, which was a real-
282. Id. at 7.
283. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, 281.
284. The Civil Liberties Amici did an excellent job distinguishing the Knotts case. See
Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 14–19. R
285. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
286. See United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May
23, 2007) (listing the features of “modern cell phones,” including “address books, calen-
dars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures”).
287. See, e.g., CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578–79 & n.14 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (describ-
ing how beepers used in traditional cases were significantly less sophisticated than cell
phones today and provided “only general information regarding the location of the
tracked object or person”).
288. Id. at 579.
289. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 n.3 (1984) (discussing advisability of
getting a warrant before installing a beeper).
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time tracking of radio signals to determine how close the car with the
beeper was to the radio monitor, constituted a search.290  Compelling
a cell phone service provider to disclose detailed records from
whatever period they are stored to indicate the movements and travels
of an individual can hardly be considered a similar investigative tech-
nique, merely because both types of data reveal information about the
target’s place in space.291
Third, because government agents in Knotts exclusively moni-
tored a car, the Court relied on the “diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile.”292  Location data, in contrast, reveals the
movements and activities of cell phone users in many places besides
their cars; modern cell phones accompany their users on walks, into
buildings, and into their homes.293  Because the Knotts Court focused
on the lack of privacy in cars on public roads, its reasoning does not
apply to location data, which can reveal a user’s location anywhere.
Just because a subset of location data may reveal what a bumper-
beeper could reveal—or even what naked-eye surveillance could re-
veal—does not mean that the technique of acquiring location data
must be constitutionally unregulated.  In Kyllo, the Court rejected the
notion that use of the thermal imaging device was not a search be-
cause, had snow been present on the roof, its melting patterns could
have revealed (without technology) the same information about heat
in the house.294  As the Court stated, “The fact that equivalent infor-
mation could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make
lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.”295  Ulti-
mately, the Court had to consider “what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”296
290. Id. at 707 & n.1.
291. PCTDD: EDNY, 515 F. Supp. 2d 325, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding use of pen regis-
ters to divulge content to violate the Fourth Amendment and observing that “[t]he evolu-
tion of technology and the potential degree of intrusion changes the analysis”).
292. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); see also United States v. Forest,
355 F.3d 942, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that because the location data in the case
divulged only the movements of a car along public highways, on facts “nearly identical to
the facts in Knotts,” its acquisition did not implicate the Fourth Amendment).
293. See James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep
Pace with Technology, in NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW 2008, at
543, 572 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Se-
ries No. 14648, 2008) (“A cell phone clearly goes places where an individual has a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.”).
294. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 34.
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The monitoring the police conducted in United States v. Karo,297
which the Supreme Court found to implicate the Fourth Amendment,
comes closer to the acquisition of location data.  In Karo, the constitu-
tional question turned on whether agents monitored the beeper “in a
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance.”298  The
Court elaborated that agents determined that “the beeper was inside
the house,” which was “a fact that could not have been visually veri-
fied.”299  The Court imposed Fourth Amendment constraints on the
government’s use of the beeper “to determine . . . whether a particu-
lar article—or a person, for that matter—is in an individual’s home at
a particular time.”300  While it is not necessary for an investigative
technique to penetrate the home to intrude upon a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, it is extremely likely that location data will reveal at
least as much information about the inside of a home as the beeper
revealed in Karo.  As discussed above, with inferences, law enforce-
ment should be able to determine, from location data, when a target
was home, awake, and on the phone.301  That would suffice to impli-
cate the Fourth Amendment under Karo and necessitate a probable
cause warrant.302
The government implies that it need not obtain a warrant before
acquiring location data because agents will not be able to tell in ad-
vance whether the target has used the cell phone in his home.  But
that putative lack of knowledge is the reason to get a warrant rather
than to be excused from getting one.303  Just as the Supreme Court
did in Karo, when it recognized that “[r]equiring a warrant will have
the salutary effect of ensuring that use of beepers is not abused[ ] by
imposing upon agents the requirement that they demonstrate in ad-
297. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
298. Id. at 714.
299. Id. at 715.  In CSI: Third Circuit, the government apparently sought location data
only after physical surveillance had “proven difficult.”  Brief for the United States, supra
note 44, at 5. R
300. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716.
301. See supra Part III.B.3; see also Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, R
at 14–19 (providing a hypothetical and actual example to illustrate the power of location
data).
302. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 708–14.
303. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 613 n.75 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that
“‘[t]he argument that a warrant requirement would oblige the Government to obtain war-
rants in a large number of cases is hardly a compelling argument against the require-
ment’” (alteration in original) (quoting Karo, 468 U.S. at 718)), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F. 3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); CSI: Houston I,
396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (arguing that uncertainty about the need for a
warrant in advance counsels in favor of getting a warrant in all cases).
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vance their justification for the desired search,”304 modern courts
should impose a warrant requirement on government acquisition of
location data.
Even if agents could somehow know that a given set of location
data would not reveal activities within the home, which they could
not, government acquisition of location data still intrudes upon a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.305  Because cell phones typically travel
in a user’s pocket or purse they are “withdrawn from public view”
under the Court’s reasoning in Karo.306  As the Court explained in
that case, agents need to “obtain warrants prior to monitoring a
beeper when it has been withdrawn from public view.”307  Agents simi-
larly need to obtain a warrant before acquiring location data.  As Jus-
tice Stevens explained in Karo,
The concealment of such [electronic devices] on personal
property significantly compromises the owner’s interest in
privacy, by making it impossible to conceal that item’s posses-
sion and location from the Government, despite the fact that
the Fourth Amendment protects the privacy interest in the
location of personal property not exposed to public view.308
Cell phones travel in users’ purses or pockets and stay with them
throughout the day and night.  An attempt to minimize the privacy
intrusion that location data monitoring309 presents by analogizing it
to bumper-beeper monitoring or even visual surveillance by police ig-
nores fundamental differences.  The bumper-beepers the Supreme
Court considered in the 1980s were tied to cars and gave only a rough
indication of how close the device was.310  Meanwhile, police depart-
ments do not have many spare police officers available for twenty-four
304. Karo, 468 U.S. at 717.
305. See, e.g., CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]echnology has
progressed to the point where a person who wishes to partake in the social, cultural, and
political affairs of our society has no realistic choice but to expose to others . . . a broad
range of conduct and communications that would previously have been deemed unques-
tionably private.”), rev’d, Order, CSI: Brooklyn, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29,
2010), ECF No. 11; CSI: Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576, 583 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (citing with
approval cases finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in location data); CSI: Houston I,
396 F. Supp. 2d at 756–57 (finding support for a reasonable expectation of privacy in
location data).
306. Karo, 468 U.S. at 716.
307. Id. at 718.
308. Id. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. By monitoring I mean either in real time or through analysis of records of location
data.
310. See Oral Argument, supra note 31, at 53:30–54:00 (EFF lawyer Kevin Bankston R
describing how the beepers used by the government in Karo worked).
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hour physical surveillance, and those officers who do conduct visual
surveillance cannot travel in people’s pockets or purses.
In United States v. Maynard, issued the month prior to CSI: Third
Circuit, the D.C. Circuit explained how modern tracking technologies
implicate the Fourth Amendment in ways that the simple bumper-
beepers the Supreme Court considered in the 1980s did not.311  The
D.C. Circuit considered the government’s continuous tracking, over
four weeks, of a GPS device installed on the defendant’s car.312  The
court found the monitoring to constitute a search, notwithstanding a
lack of evidence that the monitoring revealed activities inside a home.
According to the Maynard court, the Supreme Court left open the
question of “twenty-four hour surveillance” in Knotts when it found
that the defendant in that case had “no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his movements from one place to another” on public thor-
oughfares.313  As for Maynard, he retained a reasonable expectation
of privacy in “the totality and pattern of his movements from place to
place to place,” which is what the police obtained through their con-
tinuous GPS surveillance.314  The Maynard court explained that “[a]
reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a
record of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, des-
tination, and each place he stops and how long he stays there; rather,
he expects each of these movements to remain ‘disconnected and
anonymous.’”315  Notwithstanding the lack of information about the
inside of the home, the Maynard court reasoned that society viewed
the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable because “pro-
longed GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life
that he expects no one to have—short perhaps of his spouse.  The
intrusion such monitoring makes into the subject’s private affairs
stands in stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusion in Knotts.”316
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning that the Supreme Court’s bumper-
beeper precedents do not cover the use of prolonged GPS tracking
applies even more clearly to the use of location data monitoring.  As
lower courts have begun to realize, location data monitoring through
acquisition of location records creates an even more intimate view of
311. 615 F.3d 544, 555–66 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The EFF and ACLU of the National Capital
Area submitted an amicus brief in the case. See id. at 548.
312. Id. at 555–56.
313. Id. at 556–57 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 283 (1983)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
314. Id. at 558.
315. Id. at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 772 (N.Y. 1970)
(Breitel, J., concurring)).
316. Id.
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one’s personal activities than the GPS monitoring in Maynard.317  In
short, location data provides a continuous, pervasive, comprehensive,
and almost universally available view into the lives of ordinary people.
V. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY UNDER SMITH, MILLER,
KATZ, AND THE FOUR FACTOR TEST
A. Miller and Smith Do Not Apply
As discussed, the majority in CSI: Third Circuit rejected the gov-
ernment’s suggestion that it decide the case by making analogies to
Miller v. United States318 and Smith v. Maryland.319  In particular, the
government claimed that because targets voluntarily disclose location
data to their service providers, who retain such information in ordi-
nary business records, the targets forfeit any reasonable expectations
of privacy in the data under Miller.320  As for Smith, the government
asserted that the case establishes a rule under which non-contents data
receive none of the Fourth Amendment protection accorded to the
contents of communications.321  The Third Circuit majority properly
rejected both of the government’s arguments, but I elaborate on its
reasons for doing so because the government has made similar argu-
ments for many years, and those arguments have been crucial in un-
dermining privacy rights in online communications.322
Several key distinctions between location data and the data
sought in Miller and Smith render those decisions inapplicable to loca-
tion data.323  Unlike the records of deposits and checks the govern-
ment subpoenaed from Miller’s bank, location data records are not
actively and voluntarily created by cell phone users, who likely lack
any knowledge of what location data their service providers record.324
317. See cases cited supra note 27. R
318. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
319. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
320. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 26–28. R
321. See Government Reply Brief at 3, CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-4227) (drawing a distinction between the protection given to contents and non-
contents data).
322. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the
Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2006) (describing the application of the third-party rule in
federal and state cases).
323. My thinking about these questions has benefitted tremendously from discussions
with Kevin Bankston and Jennifer Granick of EFF.  The Civil Liberties Amici did an excel-
lent job distinguishing the Smith and Miller cases in their brief in the CSI: Third Circuit
litigation. See Civil Liberties Amici, Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 19–22 (distin- R
guishing location data from dialed telephone numbers and bank records).
324. Id.
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As the Third Circuit majority recognized, “A cell phone customer has
not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular pro-
vider in any meaningful way,” because users are unlikely to know that
providers collect and store the information.325  Similarly, the histori-
cal nature of the location data does not detract from users’ reasonable
expectations of privacy in it.  Finally, far from establishing a broad
“non-contents” rule, Smith covered only the telephone numbers the
target dialed and limited its reasoning to that data.326
1. Miller and the “Third Party” Rule
Location data is not an unprotected third-party record—to the
extent that such a thing exists.327  In Miller, the Supreme Court re-
jected the defendant’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the bank’s records of his financial transactions.328  As a result, Miller
could not complain when government agents did not first obtain a
warrant based on probable cause before they compelled the bank to
turn over records of Miller’s banking transactions.329  While the Su-
preme Court did permit warrantless access to Miller’s bank records
stored by his bank, it did not mandate a broad “third party” rule
under which users forfeit constitutional protection in things they vol-
untarily share with third parties.330  Instead, it engaged in an assump-
tion of risk analysis which, when properly considered in the location
data context, does not yield the same result.
a. Location Data Is Not Stored in “Ordinary Business Records”
The Miller Court held that customers assumed the risk that their
banks would disclose records of their deposits and copies of their
statements because banks retained those records in the ordinary
course of their business.331  Despite the government’s repeated at-
tempts to characterize the location data in the case as contained in
“routine business records,”332 it failed to produce such a business re-
325. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
326. Admittedly, the decision, like Miller, does have broader dicta. See Smith, 442 U.S.
735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” (citing
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–44 (1976))).
327. See Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 26–28 (arguing that location data is R
a third-party business record for which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy).
328. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
329. Id. at 444–46.
330. Id. at 445. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
561, 563 (2009) (quoting language from Miller to support a broader third-party doctrine).
331. Id. at 442–43.
332. Brief for the United States, supra note 44, at 2, 4, 26, 27, 35. R
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cord in the CSI: Third Circuit litigation.  The government’s “exemplar”
that it identified as resembling a location data record looked much
more like a customized report drawn from a service provider database
than a bill that a customer would actually see.333  In another location
case, the provider apparently furnished raw data to the government
rather than ordinary business records.334  In Miller, the Supreme
Court found a waiver of privacy in the fact that the customer knew the
bank would retain his records and the bank employees would encoun-
ter those records in the ordinary course of their business.335  Because
the same cannot be said for location data, a Miller-based “business
records” argument fails.336
In addition, it was not the bank’s mere ability to produce the
records that precluded Miller’s Fourth Amendment claim, but rather
the nature of the records themselves and Miller’s relationship to them
that defeated his privacy expectations.337  The Miller Court explained
that it had to “examine the nature of the particular documents sought
to be protected in order to determine whether there is a legitimate
‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”338  Much more so
than the records of a few checks and deposit slips at issue in Miller,339
location data provides detailed information about people’s communi-
cations as well as their movements and activities.340  Because location
data will often disclose extensive personal information about where
users go and how long they spend there, it much more closely resem-
333. See supra text accompanying notes 221–22. R
334. CSI: SDNY, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
335. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“All of the documents obtained, including financial
statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”).
336. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Miller involved
simple business records, as opposed to the potentially unlimited variety of ‘confidential
communications’ at issue [in a stored email case].”); see also PCTDD: EDNY, 515 F. Supp. 2d
325, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting an extension of the Miller “logic” because the informa-
tion sought was not kept by service providers in the ordinary course of their businesses).
337. See PCTDD: EDNY, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 337–38 (noting that a test based solely on a
third party’s ability to access a given piece of data would lead to unacceptable conse-
quences (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc,
532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008))).
338. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
339. Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court that bank records should not be pri-
vate when it passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 two years after the Miller
decision and guaranteed notice to targets of bank subpoenas and an opportunity to be
heard on the privacy of the records sought. See Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100–22, 92 Stat.
3697, 3697–3710 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2006))).
340. See supra Part III.A.  Although he might have, Miller raised no First Amendment
claim in his case. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 n.6; see also infra note 396 (discussing First R
Amendment interests in location data).
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bles the private communications the Miller Court found subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy than the banking records it did
not.341
b. Customers Do Not Actively and Knowingly Convey Location
Data
In addition to the almost public nature of the bank records, the
Supreme Court found that Miller had “voluntarily conveyed” his fi-
nancial information to the bank and thereby waived his reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.342  Under the Court’s logic, Miller as-
sumed the risk that the bank would disclose its records of his transac-
tions because he voluntarily and affirmatively made the bank a party
to those transactions.343  That reasoning seems questionable because
one has little choice but to use a bank if one wants to engage in mod-
ern business.344  Nonetheless, it is true that when Miller took the af-
firmative step of writing a check, he must have known that it was an
instruction to the bank’s employees to pay money to the check’s
payee.  So while the Court’s analogy of banking to confiding in one’s
friends seemed a bit stretched in Miller, it does not entirely lack
justification.345
Stretching the Supreme Court’s analogy to the location data con-
text, however, would be going too far.  In the two cases upon which
Miller relied, United States v. White346 and Hoffa v. United States,347 par-
ties to communications, which the defendants had affirmatively and
voluntarily made to them, disclosed those communications to law en-
341. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“The checks are not confidential communications but
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions.”).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.”).  In California Bankers
Ass’n v. Shultz, decided two years before Miller, the Supreme Court held that banks are
parties to customer’s financial transactions.  416 U.S. 21, 48 (1974).
344. Miller, 425 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“For all practical purposes, the
disclosure by individuals or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely
volitional, since it is impossible to participate in the economic life of contemporary society
without maintaining a bank account.”).
345. I have criticized that reasoning and argued that its strained logic counsels in favor
of limiting Miller to its facts. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protec-
tion for Stored E-mail, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 145–56 (arguing against extending Miller to
support a broad third-party doctrine); see also Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through
Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1397–1412 (2004) (criticizing the reasoning in
Miller based on an understanding of its precedents and advocating for a limited under-
standing of Miller’s holding).
346. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
347. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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forcement agents.348  In both cases, the Supreme Court found that the
defendants had assumed the risk of disclosure and had no Fourth
Amendment interest in preventing it.349  Cell phone service providers
are third parties to their users’ calls, not second parties with whom the
users are communicating.350  Because White and Hoffa addressed dis-
closures by a party to the communication, or second party disclosures,
as did Miller, none of these cases establishes a broad third-party rule
under which a person waives a privacy interest in any information that
a third party holds.351
To find White, Hoffa, and Miller controlling in the location data
context, one would need to find that cell phone users assume the risk
that their providers will be compelled to disclose their location data in
the same way that the defendants in the three precedent cases as-
sumed the risk of disclosure by the parties to their communica-
tions.352  But, cell phone users do not voluntarily, actively, and
knowingly convey location data to providers.353  Instead, cell phone
systems generate location data automatically, without any input by the
user.354  That is clearly true for registration and duration information,
which is generated without any action by the cell phone user, but even
initiation and termination information is generated by the provider’s
system to route the call.  Consequently, location data differs from the
information on a check or deposit slip that a bank customer hand-
writes as an instruction to the bank and the telephone numbers that a
348. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47; Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 295.
349. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (explaining that “the law permits . . . authorities to use the
testimony of those associates who for one reason or another have determined to turn to
the police” and permits those associates to record or transmit their conversations with the
wrongdoer); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (finding no Fourth Amendment interest in incriminat-
ing statements voluntarily revealed to a confidant).
350. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 345, at 164 (distinguishing between “cases in which R
the ISP” is a “recipient of an intended communication,” and therefore a second party, and
those in which the ISP is a “third party to a communication between two others” (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (referring to
the Bellia and Freiwald article and rejecting applicability of Miller to stored e-mail because
the service provider “was an intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails” (citing
Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 345, at 165)). R
351. See Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 345, at 164–67. R
352. See id. at 141–47 (discussing the difference between voluntary disclosures and com-
pelled disclosures).
353. See CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
29, 2010) (“In sum, Miller and Smith do not permit warrantless law enforcement access to
all historical cell site data, because the user has not ‘knowingly exposed’ or ‘voluntarily
conveyed’ that information to the provider, as those phrases are ordinarily understood.”).
354. CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756–57 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that users
do not voluntarily convey information data, which is “transmitted automatically during the
registration process, entirely independent of the user’s input, control, or knowledge”).
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telephone user actively dials into the telephone.355  Some courts have
limited the location data available only to that recorded when targets
initiate calls.356  Cell phone users, however, do not voluntarily convey
location data to providers, or tell their providers to record it.357  Quite
unlike bank statements, which are designed for customer review,358
customers can hardly know what location data their providers store
when the picture remains so opaque.359  At the same time, customers
have no reason to know when, how, or why employees would access
their location data, whether in the ordinary course of business or
not.360
Because cell phone users do not affirmatively and knowingly con-
vey location data to service providers, the mere production of location
data does not defeat customers’ reasonable expectations of privacy in
that data.  The majority in CSI: Third Circuit properly recognized this
point.361  Other cases have affirmed that mere access, which is what
providers have regarding cell phone location data, does not defeat a
user’s expectations of privacy in that data.362
For example, the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Warshak that a user’s
consent to service provider access does not forfeit a reasonable expec-
355. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“All telephone users realize that they
must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”).  The Smith Court discussed
how, not long before its decision, users had to actually convey phone numbers verbally to
live operators, and noted that the automation of the process should not make a difference
in the assumption of risk analysis. Id. at 744–45.
356. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. R
357. Perhaps we can draw an exception for some location applications in which the
user’s location is the content of the communication. See supra note 117 (discussing Gidari R
testimony).
358. The Smith court emphasized the customer’s knowledge that the phone company
could collect and record telephone numbers and did so in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (discussing the presence of dialed numbers on cus-
tomer bills and the information in telephone directories indicating a phone company’s
ability to record dialed numbers to prevent harassment and for other purposes).
359. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the lack of information about location data collec-
tion practices); see also CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing
cell phone customers’ lack of knowledge of provider collection and storage practices).
360. CSI: Third Circuit, 620 F.3d at 317–18.
361. Id. (rejecting applicability of the Smith and Miller cases to location data).
362. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2008)
(stating that it was “irrelevant” that the cellular provider could access the contents of text
messages because “[a]ppellants did not expect that Arch Wireless would monitor their text
messages, much less turn over the messages to third parties without Appellants’ consent”),
rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); see also United
States v. Long, 64 M.J. 57, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (reasoning that consent to monitoring did
not imply consent to “engage in law enforcement intrusions . . . in a manner unrelated to
maintenance of the e-mail system”).
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tation vis-a`-vis law enforcement access.  Service provider access is suffi-
ciently extensive “to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy”
only in limited situations, such as when the provider “expresses an
intention to ‘audit, inspect, and monitor’ its subscriber’s emails.”363
Notably, the Sixth Circuit rejected a monolithic expectation of privacy
that is defeated whenever the information at issue is seen by anyone.
Instead, and appropriately, the court recognized that we may permit a
service provider to run its business without relinquishing the protec-
tions of the warrant requirement—the interposition of a neutral mag-
istrate to review the propriety and need for the government to pry
into our personal communications.
c. The Historical Nature of Location Data Does Not Change the
Analysis
Some lower court cases have recognized that acquisition of for-
ward-looking, real-time location data requires law enforcement to ob-
tain a warrant but acquisition of backward-looking, historical data
does not.364  In distinguishing between historical and real-time loca-
tion data, courts have generally based their reasoning on Miller and
Smith, without offering any additional analysis of why to treat historical
data differently.365  As is true with non-content data, the ECPA treats
stored (and therefore historical) data as easier to acquire, but that
statutory distinction does not determine the constitutional analysis.
Given that Congress can hardly have considered storage of location
data in 1986 when it passed the ECPA, its decision to make it easier
for agents to acquire stored records generally should carry little or no
weight on the issue of location data.366
363. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Warshak v.
United States, 490 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008)).
364. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 600 n.42 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (collecting cases
that distinguish forward-looking and backward-looking data), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL
4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
365. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2–3 (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (“Having no Seventh Circuit precedent on the issue, this court is per-
suaded by the well-reasoned decision of the Suarez-Blanca court that the logic of the Su-
preme Court in Smith and Miller should be extended to cell-site data.”); United States v.
Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,
2008) (relying on Smith and Miller in determining that “historical cell site information is
akin to other business records maintained in the course of business”); see also CSI: Houston
II, 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (“This court concludes that a request for
historical cell-site data when the phone is idle does not raise the same concerns as might a
request for real-time cell-site data when the phone is idle . . . .”).
366. Indeed, a group of major technology companies, nonprofit organizations, civil lib-
erties groups, and academics have formed the Digital Due Process coalition and recom-
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From the perspective of the Fourth Amendment, law enforce-
ment acquisition of historical location data can intrude into personal
privacy even more than acquisition of real-time or prospective loca-
tion data.367  A law enforcement agent seeking prospective location
data could get an order on August 1st to track the target’s movements
for three months, but then would have to wait until October 31st to
have three months of location data to review.  Alternatively, the agent
could ask the provider for historical location data and immediately
obtain a year’s worth or more of the target’s location data.368  The
length of time a target’s cell phone generates records and the service
provider stores them set the only limit on the scope of the historical
records the law enforcement agent may acquire.
In addition, historical location data may be at least as informative
to law enforcement agents as prospective location data.  Historical
data may indicate with whom, where, and for how long targets have
met.  It may put a target at the scene of a crime at the time the crime
was committed and thereby refute the target’s alibi.369  Magistrate
Judge Lenihan appropriately found that “the privacy and associational
interests implicated [by acquisition of location data] are not meaning-
fully diminished by a delay in disclosure.”370  Other courts have also
recognized that law enforcement acquisition of records of historical
location data, by virtue of creating a target’s complete digital profile,
mended that Congress amend the ECPA to remove distinctions between the treatment of
historical and forward-looking data. See DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldue
process.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
367. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5, ¶¶ 61–76 (arguing that stored data impli- R
cates reasonable expectations of privacy as much as forward-looking data unless it is iso-
lated to a single point in time).  The Digital Due Process coalition recommends that
Congress protect historical location and electronic communications data just the same as it
protects prospective data. See Background, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldue
process.org/index.cfm?objectid=C00D74C0-3C03-11DF-84C7000C296BA163 (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011) (“The government should obtain a search warrant based on probable cause
before it can track, prospectively or retrospectively, the location of a cell phone or other
mobile communications device.”).
368. Historical location data could contain data of quite recent vintage. See June Hear-
ings, supra note 14, at 8 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (“How is ‘histori- R
cal’ to be defined—one second after transmission?  One hour?  One day?  One month?”
(citing Gidari, supra note 227, at 544)); see also id. (noting ambiguity whereby “prospective R
[location data] may be understood as referring to that generated anytime after the court
issues its order”).
369. See supra Part III.B.3. (illustrating the inferences that can be drawn from historical
location data).
370. CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008
WL 4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
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should receive the same Fourth Amendment protection as acquisition
of location data in real-time or prospectively.371
2. Smith Does Not Establish a “Non-Contents” Rule
Besides citing Smith as further support for its third party rule ar-
gument, the government has urged courts that the “non-contents” na-
ture of location data renders it unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment under Smith.372  As with the historical/forward-looking
distinction, the content/non-content distinction has its origin in the
SCA, which Congress passed in 1986,373 well before the explosion of
new communications technologies and associated non-contents attrib-
utes.  Again, the statutory distinction does not determine the constitu-
tional analysis.
Two recent cases illustrate how courts shortcut the analysis when
they rely on a supposed non-contents rule.  In United States v. Suarez-
Blanca374 and United States v. Benford,375 two federal district courts
granted government applications to compel the disclosure of location
data on facts apparently similar to those in CSI: Third Circuit.  In
Suarez-Blanca, the government sought initiation, termination, and du-
ration data but apparently not registration or GPS data.376  In Benford,
the court vaguely described the information sought as data “identify-
ing which cell tower communicated with the cell phone while it was
turned on,”377 which suggests that the location data included registra-
tion data, as well.  Each court found the acquisition proposed would
not implicate the Fourth Amendment,378 and the Benford court explic-
itly adopted the reasoning of the Suarez-Blanca decision.379  Neither
371. See, e.g., In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Historical Cell Site Info. for Mobile
Phone Identification Nos: (XXX) XXX-AAAA, (XXX) XXX-BBBB, & (XXX) XXX-CCCC,
509 F. Supp. 2d 64, 76 (D. Mass.) (finding no “material difference” between “real time,”
prospective, and historical tracking), rev’d, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007).
372. See Government Reply Brief, supra note 321, at 3. R
373. Act of Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, sec. 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–10 (2006)).
374. No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008).
375. No. 2:09 CR 86, 2010 WL 1266507 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010).
376. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *2.  It is unclear from the decision whether the
government acquired triangulation data or not. See id. at *11 (“The Court recognizes that
the government sought information about three towers that were used in making calls, but
there has not been any showing that the use of the three towers allows the government to
triangulate the exact location of a particular defendant.”).  If the “three towers” were for
each call, then that information would certainly permit triangulation.
377. Benford, 2008 WL 1266507, at *1.
378. Id. at *3; Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *11.
379. Benford, 2008 WL 1266507, at *3.
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court, however, engaged in a full consideration of reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy.  In a cursory discussion that ignored both the differ-
ences in the nature of location information and the way it is created,
the Suarez-Blanca court analogized location data to the telephone
numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland.380  The Suarez-Blanca court also
adopted the government’s broad reading of the third-party rule and
cited Smith and Miller for the proposition that the records’ status in
the storage facilities of the service provider deprived the defendant of
a reasonable expectation of privacy.381  The Benford court did not dis-
cuss how rich the location data might be if it were recorded at regular
and frequent intervals throughout the day, but instead agreed, with-
out further discussion, that “individuals do not have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the information showing which cell phone
tower communicated with her or her cell phone at a particular mo-
ment in the past.”382
Indeed, the information that a pen register revealed at the time
of Smith was much more limited and therefore less revealing than lo-
cation data.383  It neither indicated “the purport of any communica-
tion between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities,
nor whether the call was even completed.”384  Location data, by con-
trast, provides revealing information about the whereabouts of a user
that directly implicates his right to privacy.
Magistrate Judge Smith in the Southern District of Texas recently
issued a decision that recognized the inapplicability of Smith to loca-
tion data.385  Judge Smith distinguished Smith by noting that “[u]nlike
380. See Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156, at *8 (“[A] cell phone user voluntarily dials a
number and as a result voluntarily uses the cell phone provider’s towers to complete the
number.  The cell phone provider retains records of which towers were used in dialing a
call.  By voluntarily using the equipment, the cell phone user runs the risk that the records
concerning the cell phone call will be disclosed to police.”).
381. Id.  The court also explained that the bumper-beeper precedents did not apply
because there was no evidence that the tracking divulged information inside a home. Id. at
*9–10.
382. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507, at *2.
383. In addition, the telephone numbers at issue in Smith vary considerably from loca-
tion data, as do the risks users voluntarily assume about each. See Civil Liberties Amici,
Third Circuit Brief, supra note 80, at 19–22. R
384. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977).  It obviously did not reveal
the caller’s physical location, except to the extent it could be determined from his tele-
phone number.
385. See CSI: Houston III, Nos. H-10-998M et al., 2010 WL 4286365, at *7–14 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 29, 2010).  The government challenged Judge Smith’s decision, and I submitted an
Amicus Brief to the district court supporting Judge Smith’s denial of the government’s
applications, as did the EFF and ACLU.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Susan Freiwald in Opposi-
tion to the Government’s Request for Review, CSI: Houston III, 2010 WL 4286365 (Nos. H-
10-998M et al.).
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a wireline phone in a fixed location such as a residence, a cell phone
accompanies its user throughout the day, revealing when the user
leaves the house and when he returns.”386  More colorfully, Judge
Smith described how “[t]wo months’ worth of hourly tracking data
will inevitably reveal a rich slice of a user’s life, activities, and associa-
tions . . . .  If the telephone numbers dialed in Smith v. Maryland were
notes on a musical scale, the location data sought here is a grand
opera.”387
Beyond its “limited capabilities,” the pen register at issue in Smith
could acquire information only after the government installed it—
prospectively or in real-time.388  As mentioned, historical location data
includes comprehensive information about past travels and activities
for whatever period of time the provider retains the data.  Only the
particularity and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment can prevent the government from fishing through potentially
vast amounts of location data in violation of Fourth Amendment
principles.
To determine whether subscribers have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their location data, courts must engage in the two-part
analysis outlined in Katz, rather than simply characterize the informa-
tion as a third party record and consider the inquiry finished.389  Simi-
larly, the mere categorization of location data as either non-contents
or historical does not end the analysis.  In fact, courts have sometimes
called data “content” after determining that its acquisition implicates
a reasonable expectation of privacy, rather than determining expecta-
tions of privacy based on the characterization of the data in the first
place.390  Under a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, location
data implicates the Fourth Amendment, and its acquisition by law en-
386. CSI: Houston III, 2010 WL 4286365, at *7 n.67.  Judge Smith also discussed at some
length why United States v. Miller did not govern location data. See id. at *12–13; supra note
353. R
387. CSI: Houston III, 2010 WL 4286365, at *14.
388. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (describing the “search” question
as “rest[ing] upon a claim” of “a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers
he dialed on his phone”).
389. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5, ¶¶ 36–49 (criticizing the tendency of R
courts to rely on analytic shortcuts like a “third-party” rule and a “content/non-contents”
distinction rather than analyzing reasonable expectations of privacy).
390. See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that IP address collection by law enforcement does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, but finding that URL collection “might be more constitutionally problem-
atic” because the latter “reveals much more information,” such as what articles we read,
and thus must be treated as content).
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forcement should proceed only after agents obtain a warrant based on
probable cause.  I turn to that analysis now.
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Location Data
When the “government violates a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy that society recognizes as reasonable,” it conducts a Fourth
Amendment search.391  The Supreme Court has used that formula-
tion repeatedly since Justice Harlan first used it in his concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States in 1967.392  In Katz, the Supreme Court
found for the first time that the Fourth Amendment protects tele-
phone calls from warrantless government acquisition.393  Because gov-
ernment agents also intrude upon a cell phone user’s reasonable
expectation of privacy when they acquire his location data, they must
either obtain a warrant based on probable cause or establish an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.394  Common uses of cell phone tech-
nology support a subjective expectation of privacy in location data,
and applicable precedents support an objective expectation.
1. Subjective Expectations of Privacy in Location Data
Most cell phone users would be unpleasantly surprised, if not out-
raged, to learn that a law enforcement agent could gain access to their
location information without first obtaining a warrant based on a
showing of probable cause.  Location data may reveal to law enforce-
ment agents that a cell phone user has attended an Alcoholics Anony-
mous meeting, sought AIDS treatment, or visited an abortion clinic.395
It may also divulge when and where a user gave confession, viewed an
X-rated movie, or protested at a political rally.  Knowledge that the
government could keep track of such information could easily inhibit
valuable and constitutionally protected activities.396  As I discussed
391. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
392. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
393. Id. at 356–58 (majority opinion).
394. See id. at 359 (“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”); CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585,
610–11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“For reading the statutes in the manner advocated by the Govern-
ment would, as to at least a substantial portion of the information at issue, violate Ameri-
cans’ reasonable expectation of privacy in any cell-phone-derived information/records as
to their physical movements/locations by authorizing ex parte disclosure of that informa-
tion with no judicial review of the probable cause.”), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
395. See id. at 586 n.6.
396. In addition to implicating Fourth Amendment interests, location data disclosure
may implicate First Amendment rights of expression and association. See generally Daniel J.
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 165–76 (2007)
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above regarding the inferences one can draw from location data, as
well as the precision that location data has the potential to yield, fears
that location data will provide an intrusive eye onto a target’s private
activities are not overblown.397
Not surprisingly, cell phone users regard access to their location
data as yielding private data about their locations.  A  research report
found that seventy-three percent of cell phone users surveyed favored
“a law that required the police to convince a judge that a crime has
been committed before obtaining [historical] location information
from the cell phone company.”398  Seventy-two percent also supported
a law requiring the police to give notice to the user before the police
may obtain historical records of location data.399  Both findings
demonstrate that most users view their location data as private infor-
mation and expect it to remain private absent a compelling need for
access.400
People surely entertain a subjective expectation of privacy in their
location data and would not expect police to have access to it without
first demonstrating a compelling justification to a reviewing court.  As
Justice Stevens wrote, perhaps coincidentally in 1984, “As a general
matter, the private citizen is entitled to assume, and in fact does as-
sume, that his possessions are not infected with concealed electronic
devices.”401  For the same reasons that people expect a law enforce-
ment agent to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before he
may bug their conversations, monitor their phone calls, or subject
them to silent video surveillance, people would surely expect judicial
(identifying implications of electronic surveillance for First Amendment interests); see also
Mulligan, supra note 113, at 1587 (finding that the Supreme Court “calls for exacting scru- R
tiny under the Fourth Amendment when First Amendment interests are implicated”); see
also Lockwood, supra note 172, at 316 (“[T]he door is open for an Orwellian scenario R
whereby law enforcement agents could monitor not just criminals, but anyone with a cell
phone.”).
397. See supra Part III.
398. Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Research Report: A Supermajority of Califor-
nians Supports Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Phone Location Information
8–9 (unpublished manuscript) (Apr. 18, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1137988.
399. Id. at 8.
400. Eighty-three percent of respondents agreed that police should be able to track
them in an emergency, id. at 7, a view which statutes reflect, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7)
(2006) (providing a forty-eight hour period during which agents may wiretap without a
warrant in an emergency); see also Lockwood, supra note 172, at 316 (“[P]eople are likely to
reject the prospect of turning every cell phone into a tracking device.”).
401. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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oversight of an agent’s use of their cell phones to track their move-
ments and activities.
2. Objective Expectations of Privacy in Location Data
The objective prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
ultimately requires a court to make a normative finding about
whether users should be entitled to view the object of the search as
private.  As Justice Harlan explained in a case decided a few years after
Katz, “The critical question, therefore, is whether under our system of
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on
our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer without at
least the protection of a warrant requirement.”402  The critical ques-
tion in the location data cases is whether, in our society, law enforce-
ment agents may use cell phone technology as a window for constant
surveillance of our citizens without the procedural limits imposed by
the Fourth Amendment.  The answer must be “no.”
By analogy, the expectation of privacy users have in their location
data should be objectively reasonable.  Just as the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Katz that warrantless government eavesdropping violated
the privacy on which the target “justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth,” so too does warrantless access to location data violate
the privacy on which cell phone users justifiably rely while using their
cell phones.403  When describing government acquisition of tele-
phone conversations as a search under the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court in Katz reasoned that “[t]o read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication.”404  To deny Fourth Amend-
ment protection to location data would similarly ignore the vital role
that mobile telephony has come to play in the lives of the over 290
million subscribers in the United States.405
In the Warshak case, the Sixth Circuit recognized the need for a
normative approach to determining reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy in new communications media.  In general, the court recognized
that “[a]s some forms of communication begin to diminish, the
Fourth Amendment must recognize and protect nascent ones that
402. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
403. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see Quon v. Arch Wireless Operat-
ing Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904–06 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d and remanded sub nom. City of Ontario v.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (finding text message users to be entitled to privacy in their
messages just as telephone callers are entitled to the privacy of their telephone calls).
404. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
405. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. R
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arise.”406  Regarding e-mail in particular, the court found that it “plays
an indispensable part in the Information Age” and “requires strong
protection under the Fourth Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment would prove an ineffective guardian of private communi-
cation, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve.”407
The Warshak court’s recognition that “the Fourth Amendment
must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress,
or its guarantees will wither and perish,”408 supports a finding of an
objective expectation of privacy in location data.
C. Electronic Surveillance Under the Four Factor Test
Location data shares those features of other types of electronic
surveillance that the Supreme Court and lower courts have found to
require high procedural hurdles and extensive judicial oversight.  In
Berger v. New York,409 the Supreme Court explained that electronic
eavesdropping techniques presented “inherent dangers” and there-
fore required more “judicial supervision” and “protective procedures”
than even “conventional” searches.410  When they determined that the
Fourth Amendment required the same procedural hurdles for use of
silent video surveillance, several federal courts of appeals elaborated
on which features necessitated heightened judicial oversight.  Judge
Posner, in a widely followed Seventh Circuit decision, explained that
the hidden, continuous, indiscriminate, and intrusive nature of electronic
surveillance raises the likelihood and ramifications of law enforce-
ment abuse.411
When agents compel the disclosure of location data, they use a
technique that is similarly hidden, continuous, indiscriminate, and in-
trusive.412  Unlike the search of a home, which is usually subject to
view either by the occupant of the home or his neighbors, govern-
ment acquisition of location data is hidden.  Just as a telephone user
406. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 285 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
409. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
410. Id. at 60; see also id. at 64 (noting that a New York statute permitting eavesdropping
with insufficient judicial oversight constituted a “general warrant” in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
411. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882–85 (7th Cir. 1984); see also id. at 882
(finding it “unarguable that television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive . . . and inher-
ently indiscriminate, and that it could be grossly abused—to eliminate personal privacy as
understood in modern Western nations”); Freiwald, Online Surveillance, supra note 3, at R
79–80.
412. In fact, law enforcement agents seeking location data should perhaps satisfy the
heightened procedural requirements imposed on government wiretappers.
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does not know when a law enforcement agent has wiretapped his call,
a cell phone user does not know when a law enforcement agent has
acquired his location data.  That significantly raises the risk that
agents will exceed the scope of a proper investigation with impu-
nity.413  In addition, acquisition of location data is continuous, like the
acquisition of telephone conversations and video surveillance footage.
The longer the period an investigation spans, the greater the likeli-
hood that the government will conduct surveillance without sufficient
justification.
Besides being hidden and continuous, acquisition of location
data is inherently indiscriminate in that much of such data will not be
incriminating but will rather reveal activities that are entirely unre-
lated to criminal actions.  For example, and as mentioned, the govern-
ment’s application in CSI: Third Circuit sought location data
pertaining to a user upon whom apparently no individualized suspi-
cion had fallen.414  As discussed previously, the government has en-
gaged in expansive acquisitions of location data.415  The risk of
acquiring location information about non-incriminating activities
counsels in favor of substantial judicial oversight to reduce unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy and to ensure that searches do not become
government fishing expeditions.  Although it is possible that a request
could be so circumscribed in time and place that the data could turn
out to be unrevealing, agents cannot know that when they request the
data initially.416  In addition, government agents are unlikely to seek
such unrevealing information in the first place.
One could go so far as to argue that agents should obtain a Title
III (Wiretap Act) court order before they may compel service provid-
ers to disclose location data.417  When the federal appellate courts
considered the proper procedural hurdle for law enforcement use of
silent video surveillance in locations in which the subjects held reason-
able expectations of privacy, they imposed the substantive require-
ments of the Wiretap Act as a matter of Fourth Amendment law
413. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 & n.7 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that the
ex parte nature of location data applications makes them “particularly vulnerable to
abuse”), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008), vacated, 620 F.3d
304 (3d Cir. 2010).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 99–100. R
415. See supra text accompanying notes 257–60. R
416. See CSI: Houston I, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (concluding that a
“prudent prosecutor” would seek a search warrant before requesting location data, because
“it is impossible to know in advance whether the requested phone monitoring will invade
the target’s Fourth Amendment rights”).
417. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).
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because the statute did not apply.418  Because of the analogy to silent
video surveillance and wiretapping, the minimization, last resort, and
other substantive requirements of Title III orders may be appropriate
for location data orders, as well.  Language in the magistrate judges’
decision419 and in a few location data cases involving real-time access
suggests that courts are not entirely averse to that approach.420  Given
the difficulty establishing a warrant requirement, however, it seems
unrealistic to imagine that courts will go further and impose the
super-warrant requirement for location data acquisition.421  But
should a warrant requirement be imposed, as I believe it should,
courts will need to recognize that associated procedural protections,
such as notice and redress, will also be necessary.422
VI. CONCLUSION
Because government compulsion of disclosure of location data
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, the judicial over-
sight inherent in the probable cause warrant requirement is required.
The power and intrusiveness of the method, and its susceptibility to
418. See Freiwald, First Principles, supra note 5, ¶¶ 53–56 (“Because the four factors iden- R
tified made video surveillance, like wiretapping, particularly susceptible to abuse, the
Courts of Appeals imposed those provisions of the Wiretap Act that they viewed as incorpo-
rating the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement.”); Freiwald, Online Surveillance,
supra note 3, at 79–80 (same). R
419. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 611 & n.63 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing to other
courts that have suggested that location data searches should potentially be subject to the
Wiretap Act requirements), aff’d, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008),
vacated, 620 F. 3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
420. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322–25 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (refusing to address or rule
out whether a “more exacting showing” under the Wiretap Act may be required for real-
time access to location data).
421. Note that in the video surveillance cases, however, the federal courts of appeals
imposed those requirements on government investigators who believed that they could use
silent video surveillance cases without any statutory limits. See, e.g., United States v.
Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that the government argued that
video surveillance is entirely “unregulated”), vacated and remanded en banc, 970 F.2d 536
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1005 (1992).
422. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 476 & n.8 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
the need for government searches of stored e-mails to comply with the particularity re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); CSI:
Austin, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577–78 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (describing how notice and return of
warrants are required in location data cases due to operation of Rule 41); CSI: Austin, 727
F. Supp. 2d at 582–83 (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement
ought to apply and imposing a time limit on prospective orders); June Hearings, supra note
14, at 90–91 (statement of Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Mag. J.) (suggesting legislative re- R
forms of location data orders, including notice to targets, public reporting, duration limits,
exclusionary remedies, and civil remedies and penalties for violations).
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abuse, mean that anything less would violate Fourth Amendment
rights.  While the probable cause standard will not necessarily be that
much more demanding than the showing needed for a D order,423
the need to provide notice to the target, after the fact judicial review,
and meaningful remedies should make a significant difference.424  A
warrant must be required for location data acquisition as a matter of
law, and no Supreme Court precedents pertaining to bumper-
beepers, bank records, or telephone numbers counsel a different
result.
423. At oral argument in CSI: Third Circuit, Chief Judge Sloviter chided the government
for resisting a warrant requirement, observing that in her thirty years on the bench, magis-
trate judges had not been “very grudging” in granting warrants. See Oral Argument, supra
note 31, at 37:12–37:44.  But see supra text accompanying notes 96–104 (discussing possible R
practical differences in D order standard versus the probable cause standard).
424. See CSI: Pittsburgh, 534 F. Supp. 2d. at 585, 592 (noting that Rule 41 provides for
notice within ten days from the end of the warrant period and suppression of information
wrongfully obtained).
